

The University of Chicago

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD IN THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE: A CRITICAL
EXPOSITION OF ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL
AND METAPHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED
TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

1934

By

GEORGE DYKHUIZEN

Private Edition, Distributed by
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

1936

The University of Chicago

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD IN THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE: A CRITICAL
EXPOSITION OF ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL
AND METAPHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED
TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

1934

By
GEORGE DYKHUIZEN

Private Edition, Distributed by
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

1936



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. THE CONCEPTION OF GOD IN THE EARLY STAGES OF ROYCE'S THOUGHT	1
Royce's Early Skepticism: God as Unknowable	
Royce's Hypothetical Idealism: God as a Hypothet- ical Universal World-Consciousness	
II. GOD AS ABSOLUTE, OMNISCIENT THOUGHT	14
The Absolute as Logically Demonstrable	
The Absolute and the World of Description	
The Absolute and the World of Appreciation	
The Absolute and the Problem of Evil	
The Absolute and the Problem of Moral Evil	
The Absolute and the Problem of Physical Evil	
The Absolute as Possessing Other Attributes	
III. GOD AS A WILLING, SELF-CONSCIOUS, MORAL INDIVIDUAL INCLUSIVE OF FINITE MORAL AGENTS	33
God as Absolute Will	
The Absolute Will and the Existence of the World	
The Absolute Will and the Eternal Complete- ness of God	
The Absolute Will and its Relation to the Absolute Thought	
God as Individual	
The Individual as Object of "Exclusive Interest"	
The Individual as Possessing a Life-Plan	
God as Self-Conscious Moral Ego	
Self-Consciousness as "Social Contrast-Effect"	
Man as Finite Self-Conscious Moral Ego	
God as Divine Self-Conscious Moral Being	
The Relation of God and the Finite Moral Being	
The Temporal Relations of God and Man	
The Eternal Relations of God and Man	
Restatement of the Argument for the Existence of God: The Internal and External Meanings of Ideas	

Chapter	Page
God as a "Self-Representative System"	
Concluding Remarks	
IV. GOD AS THE "BELOVED COMMUNITY"	55
Its Basis in Morality	
Its Basis in Religion	
The Universal Community	
The Lost Individual	
Salvation and Atonement	
Its Basis in Epistemology and Metaphysics	
Concluding Remarks	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	64
The Writings of Royce	
Expositions and Criticisms of Royce's Philosophy	
Miscellaneous Works Read or Consulted in the Preparation of the Present Essay	

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD IN THE EARLY STAGES OF ROYCE'S THOUGHT

In the preface of his first book, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Royce remarks that it is his desire to sketch "the basis of a system of philosophy, while applying the principles of this system to religious problems." He further states that "the religious problems have been chosen for the present study because they first drove the author to philosophy, and because they, of all human interests, deserve our best efforts."¹ This desire of Royce to formulate a system of philosophy whose principles can be used to solve the problems of religion remained with Royce throughout his life and may be said to have determined the general tenor of his philosophy. In the pages which follow, an attempt has been made to trace the various forms which Royce's philosophy assumed in the course of its development and to see how the principles of his philosophy were applied to the religious problem par excellence, the problem of God.

In making philosophy serve the purposes of religion Royce was but following the trend of his time. W. T. Harris in introducing his Journal of Speculative Philosophy in 1867 said,

"There is no need, it is presumed, to speak of the immense religious movements now going on in this country and in England. The tendency to break with the traditional, and to accept only what bears for the soul its own justification, is widely active, and can end only in the demand that Reason shall find and establish a philosophical basis for all those great ideas which are taught as religious dogmas."²

Royce expresses the situation in respect to the religious thought of his day as follows:

"The religious thought of our time has reached a position that arouses the anxiety of all serious thinkers, and the

¹The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (2nd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1887), p. v.

²"Introduction to the Reader," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, I (1867), 1.

interest of many who are not serious. We are not content with what we learned from our fathers; we want to correct their dogmas, to prove what they held fast without proof, to work out our own salvation by our own efforts. But we know not yet what form our coming faith will take. We are not yet agreed even about the kind of question that we shall put to ourselves when we begin any specific religious enquiry. People suggest very various facts or aspects of facts in the world as having a religious value. The variety of the suggestions shows the vagueness of the questions that people have in mind when they talk of religion. One man wants to worship Natural Law, or even Nature in general. Another finds Humanity to be his ideal object of religious veneration. Yet another gravely insists that the Unknowable satisfies his religious longings."¹

But whatever the specific form of religion may be, it is possible says Royce to pick out certain universal traits in religion. All men make certain demands of religion: "They all want religion to define for them their duty, to give them the heart to do it, and to point out to them such things in the real world as shall help them to be steadfast in their devotion to duty."²

Our religious thought, in offering a theory of reality, comes into intimate contact with theoretical philosophy. Our religious consciousness maintains that our ideals ought to be attainable in the actual universe and that if we finite individuals are unable to bring about their realization, then some other Being mightier than we ought to exist who is able and willing to give to our ideals the place in the universe which we think they ought to possess. "The problem our religious consciousness is the problem whether we have any right to regard such a Being as himself a fact, or the whole world of facts, seen and unseen by us, as the expression of his will, or as destined in the end, or on the whole, to manifest this will."³ It is in the attempt to answer this question that we must enlist the aid of philosophy.

In the pages which follow, an attempt will be made to trace the development of Royce's conception of God through the

¹The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 6.

²Ibid., pp. 6-7.

³"The Problem of Natural Religion," The International Quarterly, VIII (1903), 85-107. This article first appeared as The Dudley Lecture for 1901-1902, a typewritten copy of which is in the library of Harvard University.

various stages of his philosophical thinking. Accordingly, we turn first of all to a study of Royce's early philosophy as revealed in certain essays.

Royce's Early Skepticism: God as Unknowable

In the year 1878, in his unpublished "Thought Diary,"

Royce writes:

"Every man lives in a Present, and contemplates a Past and Future. In this consists his whole life. The Future and Past are shadows both, the Present is the only real. Yet in the contemplation of the Shadows is the Real wholly occupied; and without the Shadows this Real has for us neither life nor value. No more universal fact of consciousness can be mentioned than this fact which therefore deserves a more honorable place in Philosophy than has been accorded to it."¹

This idea that the present alone is real and that when taken apart from a conceived past and future it is entirely meaningless is the point of departure for both Royce's theory of knowledge and of morals.

In the essay entitled "On Purpose in Thought" Royce discusses the problem as to the final end of purely theoretical thought. "Thought aims at constructing a notion of a future."² It aims at building up a world of future experience, and this future will be similar to the past since all experience is uniform. Thought seeks and attains "an ideal picture of a world of experience that shall be seen as One."³

The mechanism by means of which thought attains this end can be described as follows: As already mentioned, the present alone is real. The sense-content of the present moment is ready-made and absolute,—it is an ultimate datum given to and not created by the mind. In and by itself, however, the present moment is inadequate and meaningless,—it "does not satisfy us. It is poor and empty."⁴ Hence the mind attempts to escape from

¹"Thought Diary," (Berkeley, 1878-9, Harvard University Library, Unpublished), entry for April 3, 1878. Cf. also, "The Nature of Voluntary Progress," Fugitive Essays, p. 113; "Tests of Right and Wrong," Ibid., p. 199 ff.; "On Purpose in Thought," Ibid., p. 249 ff.; and "Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, XV, 376 ff.

²"On Purpose in Thought," Fugitive Essays, p. 251.

³Ibid., pp. 259-60.

⁴"The Nature of Voluntary Progress," Fugitive Essays, p. 113.

the insufficiency of the present moment and to arrive at a meaningful world. This it does through a creative and constructive function which it possesses. In every act of knowing the mind takes the momentarily present sense-data and refers them to something beyond this present moment to a past and future. In every act of judgment there is "an acknowledgment of something that is not given, but that is said to be remembered or believed as a part of past experience,"¹ and there is a like acknowledgment or "expectation of a future."² Royce, thus, agrees with Kant that in consciousness there is always a given which the mind passively receives and also a spontaneous activity of thought. But Royce disagrees with Kant as to the nature of these two aspects of mind. For Kant, thought rearranges its sense-material and makes it conform to the laws of thought. For Royce, on the other hand, the given is ultimate. Sense-data, with their spatiality and sequences, though momentary and instantaneous, are complete in themselves and need no "officious understanding" to rearrange them. What thought does is to give the sense-data of the "puny present moment" a reference to the past and future. It does not enter in and give form to sense but, getting its cue from present sense, it constructs or projects a world into the past and future.

An important distinction must be noted at this point. According to Royce "the conception of past or future is only completed and made quite definite in so far as relates to its general forms, not in so far as relates to its particular content."³ There is accordingly both a necessary and a contingent element in our experience. Certain sequences are fundamental and absolutely uniform so that everything in experience, whether past, present, or future "is throughout in necessary connection, is made up of causes and effects, joined in necessary union."⁴ But the particular content Royce conceives of "not as necessary, but as probable."⁵ This distinction enables Royce to account for the fact of error. We are conscious of error, says Royce, "when a present content of experience is found contrasting with and contradicting an expectation now conceived as past."⁶ An hypothesis can be

¹"Tests of Right and Wrong," Fugitive Essays, p. 201.

²Ibid., p. 202.

³"On Purpose in Thought," Fugitive Essays, p. 257; italics mine.

⁴Ibid., pp. 257-58.

⁵Ibid., p. 258.

⁶Ibid., p. 256.

considered true when a future experience verifies it: it is false when our expectation is disappointed by future experience.

It may be asked why thought projects a past and future and why it makes judgments about them. Royce's answer is that thought always arises in response to certain needs. "Beliefs," he says, "are always the satisfaction of individual wants. No belief can be said to be forced upon anyone in any other sense than that it is accepted because it satisfies a conscious want."¹ Our expectations, our hypotheses, always arise in response to needs. Thus it is possible to state the nature of truth in a slightly different way.

"The adjective 'true' is applied to a belief by the one whose intellectual want it satisfies, at the time when it satisfies them. . . . A system of beliefs is held, just as system of government endures, so long as it seems to the men concerned advantageous to cling to it. Beliefs change, like institutions, when they no longer accomplish the end of their existence."²

On the other hand, a false belief is one which does not fulfil the purpose for which it was called forth, but leaves our want unsatisfied.

It is not private individual satisfaction, however, that must be taken as the criterion of truth. Rather, it is the satisfaction accorded to mankind at large. "My needs are narrow and changing. It is humanity in its highest development to which truth will be acceptable."³ It is in the essay entitled "Doubting and Working" that Royce discusses the social nature of truth. He writes: "Now, what would be the abiding and satisfactory truth if we found it? Evidently, this truth would have one great characteristic. It would be of a nature to demand acceptance from all men."⁴

Royce's point of departure in ethics, as in epistemology, is the insufficiency of the present moment. Epistemology shows that the present alone is real. If this be the case, the question arises: What, then, is an individual? Is an individual a being that persists and remains identical with itself through all the changes of consciousness? "Perhaps that is what I mean," says

¹"The Nature of Voluntary Progress," Fugitive Essays, p. 112.

²Ibid., p. 113.

³"Doubting and Working," Fugitive Essays, p. 338.

⁴Ibid., p. 337.

Royce, "but one thing is plain, such a permanent, identical being is never given to me at all in experience."¹ All I find in my experience, says Royce following Hume, is a datum of consciousness, e.g., a feeling of personality, an emotion of selfishness or of self-respect. This present moment of consciousness, however, is continually acknowledging more than the present; it is acknowledging a certain conceived past and future. I also posit as real many past experiences which are not mine and conceive as real future experiences which are different from those which I call mine. These other conceived centers of experience, past, present, and future, I speak of as my neighbors.

The supreme moral end of the individual is "conscious union of every being with the great whole of conscious life."² "Devotion, then, to universal conscious life, is the goal of conscious life itself; or the goal is the self-reference or self-surrender of each conscious moment to the great whole of life, in so far as that whole is within reach."³

This devotion or self-surrender to the whole of conscious life constitutes the essence of religion—it is "the essential element of that greatest of higher human agencies, Religion."⁴ Royce's philosophy of religion at this stage of his thought can, perhaps, be best stated in the words which he uses to summarize that of George Eliot:

"Religious knowledge and life come to us then, through the influence of individual souls, whose sympathy and counsel awaken us to a new sense of the value of life, and to a new earnestness to work henceforth not for self but for the Other than self. This Other, as you see, is always at least negatively infinite; it takes in this philosophy the place of the supernatural. You know not its boundaries. This grand ocean of life stretches out before you without discovered shore. You are brought to the strand. Will you embark? To embark and lose yourself is religion; to wait on the shore is moral starvation."⁵

Can this supreme goal of life, "the making of human life

¹"Tests of Right and Wrong," Fugitive Essays, pp. 210-11.

²"Pessimism and Modern Thought," Fugitive Essays, p. 184.

³Ibid., p. 183.

⁴"George Eliot as a Religious Teacher," Fugitive Essays, p. 184.

⁵Ibid., p. 281.

broader, fuller, more harmonious, better possessed of abiding belief,"¹—can this end be realized? This inquiry leads to a study of Royce's early metaphysics. Royce believed that the questions of metaphysics could be answered only after the problem of epistemology has been solved. Thus in the article "Mind and Reality" he asserts: "Ontology is play. Theory of knowledge alone is work. Ontology is the child blowing soap bubbles. Philosophical analysis is the miner digging for gold."² And because "the theory of knowledge is yet to be complete," because there are "wide oceans of doubt"³ between its conception and realization, it follows that all ontological speculations must be purely tentative in character. "How the individual mind, shut up in a world of sense, of momentary judgments, of dim memories and expectations, . . . can know and grasp this all-enfolding Unity of Being . . . ?"⁴—this is the problem crying for solution.

There is, then, no demonstrable basis for any of the current ontologies. What ontology we hold must be determined by ethical considerations. Our thinking activity receives its ultimate justification from its moral worth; our judgments are "capable of no restatement in terms of any absolute warrant whatever."⁵ Beyond the moral there is no more ultimate warrant; the goal of philosophy is a suitable ethical doctrine.

The answer to the great question of religion as to whether the great goal of life will ever be attained is now clear. In view of the uncertainty of our knowledge as to the ultimate nature of the universe and of our world, says Royce, the only answer is: ignoramus et ignorabimus.⁶ "According to our present notion of the universe we stand alone, a few specks of life in the darkness of infinite space, in the midst of nature forces whose resources we shall never more than very meagerly estimate, with an unknown future before us, in which what appalling accidents may happen, we can never with faint show of accuracy foresee."⁷

¹"Doubting and Working," Fugitive Essays, p. 344.

²"Mind and Reality," Mind, VII (1882), 41.

³Ibid., p. 30.

⁴"Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, XV (1881), 370-71.

⁵"The Eternal and the Practical," Philosophical Review, XIII (1904), 116-17.

⁶"The Nature of Voluntary Progress," Fugitive Essays, p. 131.

⁷Ibid., p. 131.

This uncertainty concerning the future is no justification for betraying our ideals and for ceasing to work for their realization. "It is a cowardly soul that needs the certainty of success before it will work. It is a craven who despairs and does nothing because what he can do may turn out to be a failure. Whatever future growth eliminates from human nature, it is to be hoped that one trace of universal warfare will survive, namely the courage that can face possible, even probable destruction, with the delight of a hero in resisting and planning and working so long as he can raise his arm."¹ The essence of the religious attitude toward the world is "neither optimism nor pessimism, but simply earnestness, determination to make the world significant."²

The analogy between Royce's epistemological and ethical theories is obvious. Just as in knowledge the present moment when taken by itself is meaningless, so in morality the self of the moment is without significance. Just as in theory of knowledge the present moment must be projected into and related to a past and future, so in theory of morals the ego must be extended so as to embrace an ideal future. Just as in logical theory truth can become objectified only in so far as it is socialized, so in moral theory the good can become real only in so far as the individual becomes a part of the social whole.

The skepticism of these early essays is clearly evident. Every sincere judgment is true for the moment in which it is made but not necessarily true for other moments. We have "confidence" that it is true for future experience but we have no "absolute warrant" that this is so. In fact, we cannot know for a certainty that there will be future experience at all. "There is no chance of demonstrating that any present moment is not the end of all time."³ We can only postulate a future and can only postulate that this future will be similar to the present and past. In short, says Royce, we can be sure of each moment as it comes, but we can be sure of nothing else,—all else we must postulate or do without. Everything beyond the present moment is doubtful.

The influence of William James on the thought of Royce at this time is marked. Royce, in an article written some years later comments on this stage of his thinking and speaks of having been "deeply influenced by Professor James's earlier lectures and essays." Royce's voluntaristic theory of ideas and of truth and

¹Ibid., pp. 131-32.

²"George Eliot as a Religious Teacher," op. cit., p. 289.

³"Tests of Right and Wrong," op. cit., p. 202.

error would seem to be the outgrowth of the influence of which he speaks.

That Royce was not entirely satisfied with the theory of ideas and of knowledge which he had taken over from James and that he was even at this time entertaining a line of thought which was destined to lead his philosophy into an entirely new direction, the following section will attempt to indicate.

Royce's Hypothetical Idealism: God as a Hypothetical
Universal World-Consciousness

In the article entitled "Mind and Reality" in which Royce accepts the Berkeleian hypothesis of a universal consciousness, we seem to get a glimpse of one of the reasons why Royce found James's theory of ideas inadequate and why he inclined to Berkeley's theory of idealism. Though he remained convinced of the truth of James's doctrine that ideas are essentially practical in character,¹ Royce was equally convinced that this doctrine did not state the whole truth about ideas. While true ideas do lead to successful activity, they have another characteristic which explains why they are successful, namely, they correspond to reality as it actually is. This reality is not the creation of any practical intention of ours, but is in some way independent of our ideas and stands authoritatively over against them. The theoretical demands of our thought seem to require that there be an external reality that "corresponds to our ideas, and so gives them truth." Royce felt that James's doctrine was only a half-truth and needed to be supplemented. In fact, Royce seems to say as much in a much later article from which we have already quoted.² He asserts that during this early formative period he came to believe "that it is one function of the truth to be, amongst other things, actually true," that is, to correspond with reality; but he did not believe that this position was incompatible with his pragmatism. He still believed himself "to be, in a very genuine sense, still a pragmatist."³

Another reason why Royce found his early skepticism unsatisfactory was that it was religiously uninspiring. What hope and comfort can be derived from all our striving, he asks, if we

¹Cf. "How Beliefs Are Made," Fugitive Essays, written after the essay on Berkeley. In this article Royce gives a purely voluntaristic account of the origin of beliefs.

²"The Eternal and the Practical," Philosophical Review, XIII (1904), 117-18.

³Ibid., p. 118.

are always confronted with the disheartening thought that the next instant may be the last.¹

Now there is a way, says Royce, by means of which we can partially escape the deadening influence of the world of doubt. It is the way which we have been treading throughout our search for truth and satisfaction, namely, the way of postulates. Since we have come so far along the way of postulates already, why may we not take one further step and make a postulate which will have religious and moral value "remembering that we who postulated once have the right to postulate again."²

The essay on Berkeley, however, was written, as Royce himself expressly states, in order to meet the theoretical and not the practical demands of our nature. In fact, whatever religious and moral value Berkeley's theory is found to possess is discarded by Royce in order "to ward off the suspicion of any ulterior designs hidden by this our hypothesis."³ The argument of the article starts from the admitted facts of popular belief which are: first, there is a permanently abiding external world; second, ideas must in some way correspond to this world if they are to be true.

By means of examples Royce shows that Berkeley's hypothesis is "a simple expression, easily intelligible, for all the facts and laws of physics, of nervous physiology, and of consciousness."⁴ But it is after all only a hypothesis. Will it be able to stand the test of criticism, especially that which proceeds from the theory of knowledge. This Royce undertakes to determine in the latter part of the article under discussion.

Both modern science and popular thought hold that external reality is the cause of our ideas. The ether waves, or molecular vibrations, cause our sensations of color or heat but have no likeness or correspondence to them. And in the field of philosophy, says Royce, Kant, also, maintained that external reality, the thing-in-itself, was the cause of our ideas.

But is "cause" the primary category of our thought about external reality, asks Royce. Does judgment postulate an external order primarily in order to have a cause for our perceptions and in order to satisfy our demands for causal sequence? Royce insists not. The primary reason why judgment postulates a world is the demand of our thought that there be an external reality that

¹The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 291-92.

²Ibid., p. 292.

³"Mind and Reality," Mind, VII (1881), 42.

⁴Ibid., p. 41.

"corresponds to our ideas, and so gives them truth."¹ In other words, according to Royce, the category of "correspondence" takes precedence over the category of "cause" in our thought about the external world.

The external world means, then, according to the argument of correspondence, "the possible and actual present, past, and future content of consciousness for all beings."² External reality is not merely like our conscious data, but, in order to make this likeness itself possible, it is in fact "an actual or a possible datum of some present, past, or future consciousness."³ Thus my present state of consciousness is similar to a past or future state of my own or of a person like me; the conclusions of science which have not yet received verification in the actual experience of any one are like the conclusions reached by a mind in a future "possible experience."

Accordingly, Royce makes the hypothesis that there exists a consciousness for which all possible experiences are present and actual facts. The identity of this consciousness is obvious. It is the Berkeleian Universal Consciousness shorn of its teleological and causal elements. Royce finds confirmation, thus, of his assertion that in Berkeley's hypothesis we have "a convenient expression of one side, the theoretical, of our postulates about reality."⁴

The conception of God which follows from this stage of Royce's thought should be noted. Berkeley, as is well known, used his hypothesis as a weapon against Atheism. God, for Berkeley, is a Spirit who has definite dealings and purposes with men and who is also the continuous cause of the existence of our so-called external world. But such a conception is precluded by Royce's emasculated version of Berkeley's hypothesis.

In the first place, if we venture to call this world-consciousness God, it should be remembered that it is not a world-spirit but a world-mind. And this mind, as thus far portrayed, is not a mind similar to human mind. For human mentality is suffused with feeling, emotion, and volition. We can, if we wish, says Royce, call it mind, but we must at once add that it is "inhuman Mind,"—it is cold and dead, lacking the traits of living

¹The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 354. In portions of this book Royce is repeating the position of the article under discussion.

²Mind, VII (1881), 49.

³Ibid., p. 50.

⁴Ibid., p. 54.

minds.¹ It is merely the "universal Knowing One" utterly lacking the usual sensitivities of living beings.

In the second place, as the argument of correspondence has shown, this universal consciousness is not a cause or "Power,"² creating the world by a display of force or by a divine fiat of will. Rather, this consciousness is thought, and all existent things are its thoughts or are represented in its thought. But, so far as our theory goes, this consciousness does not "make its own states,"³—it only sees them.

A further point to be observed is that Royce accepts idealism of the Berkeleian type as only an hypothesis. In all the later stages of his thought Royce becomes convinced that Idealism, that is, Absolute Idealism, is a "demonstrable truth,"—that its very denial implies its affirmation. But at this point in his philosophy Royce finds some such hypothesis as that of Berkeley necessary if we are to do justice to the theoretical demands of our thought about reality.

But though this hypothesis is simple and plausible, it is not without its difficulties, says Royce. There is one particular difficulty which is attached to this hypothesis. That difficulty concerns the nature of truth. If truth consists in the correspondence of my ideas with the ideas of the Universal Consciousness, how am I ever to get out of my consciousness and compare my thoughts with those of the World-Mind? During the years immediately following the publishing of the article on Berkeley, Royce wrestled with this problem until finally, in the year 1885, he reached what he considered a satisfactory solution the argument of which he states in his first published book on philosophy, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy.

It should be noted that truth still is defined by Royce as that which satisfies a need, as the article "How Beliefs Are Made," written in the year following that in which the article on Berkeley appeared, reveals. But truth is also defined as that which faithfully corresponds to an external world. These two conceptions of truth, the practical and the theoretical, the voluntaristic and the intellectualistic, persist throughout Royce's philosophy; and his attempt to harmonize these two strains of his thought furnish one of the crucial points of his system and of his conception of God.

Finally, it should be noted that at this stage of his thinking Royce accepts Berkeley's view of the world-mind rather

¹Ibid., p. 42.

²Ibid., p. 54.

³Mind, VII, 54.

than that of Hegel. The world-mind is a spiritual substance having ideas rather than a world-process realizing ideals. "A world, the manifestation of the universal reason, developing in time, how can any reflective mind be content with this account of things?" asks Royce.¹ The reason for this dissatisfaction with panlogism would seem to be an axiological one. If being is a process attempting to reach rational goals why, after an infinity of time has it not reached some of them. As a matter of fact, "We mortals know of no one point in the universe where one might lay his hand and say: Here is the ideal attained."² On the other hand, spiritual substance, remaining in its innermost essence the same, furnishes a ground for the creation, attainment, and perpetuation of value. Mind as process does furnish a ground for development and change, but not for the attainment and realization of ideals. Another crucial point in Royce's philosophy is reached when he attempts to harmonize the conception of an eternal absolute with that of change and progress in time.

¹Essay on Kant, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, XV (1880), 366.

²Ibid., p. 368.

CHAPTER II

GOD AS ABSOLUTE, OMNISCIENT THOUGHT

In the years immediately following the publication of the article on Berkeley, Royce devoted himself to a search for a way out of his skepticism, a way other than that of postulate. The way of postulates gives heart, perhaps, to one immersed in skepticism, but it has its weakness: "The world of postulates was a brighter one only because we determined to make it so. But there was something lonesome in the thought that the postulates got, as answer from the real world, only their own echo, and not always that. Their world was rather their own creation than an external something that gave them independent support."¹ And so Royce desires to find "a more excellent way"² out of his skepticism, a way which will remove every vestige of doubt from his philosophy.

Royce's immediate problems, thus, are these: Can the existence of a universal consciousness such as Berkeley proposed be empirically or logically established? And if its existence is established, can it be endowed with qualities of ethical and religious worth? The answers which Royce gives to these questions constitute other crucial points of his argument. It is in the last chapters of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, which appeared in 1885, that Royce gives his solutions to these problems.

The Absolute as Logically Demonstrable

Since the existence or non-existence of God is a matter of fact, it would seem that the world of facts, both physical and moral, would supply an answer to the question as to whether or not the absolute thought exists. But this is not the case. As we survey the world of moral individuals, we find clash and conflict everywhere. Each individual will is seeking its own ideal; or, if there is no conflict between individuals, then there are groups or systems or civilizations whose ideals are at war with one another. Even within the individual himself there is lack of

¹The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 435; this book referred to below as R. A. P.

²Ibid., p. 331.

unity and coherence among ideals. To the pessimist, this conflict indicates the futility of the moral life; to one who wishes to live and act manfully, this conflict points to an ideal, namely, a social order in which there will be a cessation of conflict and which all possible wills are joined together in absolute harmony so as to constitute a universal will.¹

As one turns to the world of physical facts one becomes even more perplexed. The world which science investigates, the world as commonly believed in, impresses one with its conflicts of forces and powers and with the strange contrasts which appear in it. "Now it reveals to you, in the mechanics and physics of the stars or in the processes of living things, vast realms of marvelous reasonableness; now it bewilders you, in the endless diversities of natural facts, by a chaos of unintelligible fragments and of scattered events; now it lifts up your heart with wondrous glimpses of ineffable goodness; and now it arouses your wrath by frightful signs of cruelty and baseness."² In short, the world of physical facts casts no light on the problem of God's existence. It is "either dumb, or else given to dark and doubtful speeches";³ "the jargon of their contending voices will not unite into any religious harmony."⁴ When viewed in and by itself the world of powers is, as Bertrand Russell remarks, a world "void of meaning" and "purposeless" wherein is heard nothing but "the trampling march of unconscious power."⁵

The existence of the world-thought, thus, cannot be empirically established. If its existence is to be ascertained, it must be by means other than an appeal to moral and scientific facts. How Royce came to appeal to theory of knowledge to help him out of his predicament is best described by him:

"From the depths of this imperfectly defined skepticism, which seemed to him provisionally the only view he could adopt, the author escaped only by asking the one question more: 'If everything beyond the present is doubtful, then how can even that doubt be possible?' With this question that bare relativity of the present moment is given up. What are the conditions that make doubt logically intelligible? These conditions really transcend the present moment. Plainly doubt implies

¹Ibid., chaps. 2-7.

²The World and the Individual, I, 17.

³R. A. P., p. 286.

⁴Ibid., p. 237.

⁵"The Free Man's Worship," Philosophical Essays (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910), pp. 60, 70.

that the statement doubted may be false. So here we have at least one supposed general truth, namely, 'All but the immediate content of the present moment's judgment, being doubtful, we may be in error about it.' But what then is an error? This becomes at once a problem of exciting interest. Attacking it, the author was led through the wilderness of the following argument."¹

The argument to which Royce refers and which it is now necessary to examine is really a positive statement of the old negative saying that a thorough-going skepticism contradicts itself, but Royce's presentation is an original and ingenious one.

If we assume with Berkeley, says Royce, that the mind can know only its own ideas, then it follows that truth and sincerity are identical. For a judgment then is simply a statement of what goes on in one's mind. Thus, if an individual makes the judgment that this book is interesting, he is simply asserting what he finds to be the case in his own experience. In so far as he is sincere in what he says his judgment truly reflects what is occurring in his mind. Hence, every man's judgment, in so far as it is sincere, is a true judgment and error becomes impossible. But, says Royce, we all assume that judgments can be really true and really false. But this can be possible only if our various individual judgments can have a common or identical object which can be set authoritatively over against these judgments and determine not their relative but their absolute truth or falsity. Our various individual assertions must meet on some common ground if they are to be appraised objectively and not merely on the ground of subjective sincerity. Now how are we going to get an object which is common to all judgments if we are each confined to our own private, independent minds? Berkeley's position would appear to require modification if it is to account for the possibility of error.

Psychology, moreover, does not help us to explain the possibility of error. Psychology tends to define judgment as Ueberweg does, namely, as the "Consciousness about the objective validity of a subjective union of ideas."² This definition implies that there are three elements to a judgment: "The Subject, with the accompanying shade of curiosity about it; the Predicate, with the accompanying sense of its worth in satisfying a part of our curiosity about the subject; and the Sense of Dependence, whereby we feel the value of this act to lie, not in itself, but

¹R. A. P., pp. 389-90. Italics Royce's.

²Ibid., p. 402.

in its agreement with a vaguely felt Beyond, that stands out there as Object."¹ But hereupon arises the question as to the specific nature of the relation between a judgment and its object. Certain it is, says Royce, that the judgment selects the object with which it wishes to agree, for we never condemn a judgment if it fails to agree with an object with which it never intended to agree. "A judgment has as object only what it intends to have as object. It has to conform only to that to which it wants to conform."² And this fact presents a serious difficulty in explaining the possibility of error. For when a judgment selects an object with which it wishes to agree, it must already know that object, for "the essence of an intention is the knowledge of what one intends."³ In other words, choosing and knowing an object seem to be invariably together. If this be the case, how can such a judgment be false? It is no answer to say that the single judgment can intend an object which is only vaguely and impartially defined and so can be in error about the object as clearly and fully defined; for, "In so far as it is not defined, it is however not object for this judgment at all, but for some other one."⁴ And it is only with the help of these other judgments that a single judgment can be shown to be in error about its objects as fully and completely known. In short, if a single isolated judgment with its intended object is taken, the possibility of error cannot be explained and for these reasons: first, judgments must have an identical object, one that is common to all, if they are to be really true or false; second, a single judgment can never know that it is in error unless there are other judgments having the same object with which it can be compared.

All of our difficulties are swept away, says Royce, if we declare "That all the many Beyonds, which single significant judgments seem vaguely and separately to postulate, are present as fully realized intended objects to the unity of an all-inclusive, absolutely clear, universal, and conscious thought, of which all judgments, true or false, are but fragments, the whole being at once Absolute Truth and Absolute Knowledge."⁵ If we accept as real the absolute thought, an error becomes perfectly intelligible. An error is "an incomplete thought, that to a higher thought, which includes it and its intended object, is known as having failed in the purpose that it more or less clearly had, and that is fully realized in this higher thought."⁶ In short, the

¹Ibid., p. 402. Italics Royce's.

²Ibid., p. 397.

³Ibid., p. 397.

⁴Ibid., p. 404.

⁵Ibid., p. 423.

⁶Ibid., p. 425.

existence of an all-inclusive system of truth as the logical counterpart of an infinity of errors, implies the existence of an absolute mind capable of comprehending that system.

This doctrine, says Royce, eliminates the unfavorable element in Berkeley's doctrine, namely, subjectivism. In reply to the question: How can the human mind get out of itself in order to know its object? our answer is: "You, in one sense, namely, never do or can get beyond your own ideas, nor ought you to wish to do so, because in truth all those other minds that constitute your outer and real world are in essence one with your own self. This world of ideas is essentially one world, and so it is essentially the world of one self and That art Thou."¹ The antithesis ordinarily made between the finite self and its external world is a false one leading to "insoluble problems."² The true antithesis is that between the finite self with all its limitations and the infinite self which in reality is the finite self completely conscious and expressed. The objects, or beyonds, which our single finite judgments intend and vaguely grasp are already "fully realized intended objects to the unity of an all-inclusive, absolutely clear, universal, and conscious thought, of which all judgments, true or false, are but fragments, the whole being at once Absolute Truth and Absolute Knowledge."³

It is of interest at this point to attempt an estimate of Royce's argument for the existence of an absolute thought, and to ask whether Royce's account of the possibility of error is the only one that can be given. Since Royce's point of departure is the Berkeleian idea of spiritual substances having ideas and since it is the subjectivism inherent in this view which furnishes Royce with his fundamental problem, it will be necessary first of all to turn to Berkeley's thesis that minds and their ideas are all that exist. If it can be shown that Berkeley's view rests upon questionable assumptions, it may be possible to show that Royce's doctrine of truth and error does not possess the logical inevitableness which Royce claims for it.

Berkeley's theory has much that enlists our support as becomes evident when we restate his doctrine in terms of more recent philosophy. Stated in recent terminology, Berkeley's view insists that our experience is continuous with and organic to the reality which lies beyond it and which is responsible for it. There is no

¹The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 368; italics Royce's. This book referred to below as S. M. P. See, too, ibid., p. 481.

²R. A. P., pp. 232, 233.

³ibid., p. 423.

abrupt break, no metaphysical dualism of mind and matter which must somehow be bridged if mind is to know the so-called material world. According to Berkeley, the entire world of so-called matter is given, or may conceivably be given by God to our minds because the two are not divorced and independent of each other. This view that the finite mind gets its content from a world which it presupposes and of which it is an organic part would scarcely be denied by any serious thinker. The view that something not alien to mind is given to mind would appear to be an indubitable and ultimate fact. To this extent we can agree with Berkeley and Royce. However, the real problem now becomes that of stating in detail the nature of the finite mind and its relation to the world. And it is at this point that the present thesis parts company with that of Berkeley and Royce.

First of all, it is questionable whether the mind to which something is given is a mental substance as Berkeley asserts. Hume's argument still retains its force. According to Hume all substance, mental or material, has the same ontological status. If material substance is to be abrogated, it would seem that for the same reasons mental substance should be denied existence. To admit the one while denying the other is to enmesh oneself in a net of logical contradictions. In attempting to eliminate the dualism between mind and matter and in refusing to reduce mind to matter, Berkeley was performing a real service to philosophy. However, in asserting that matter can be reduced to mind and that mind and its ideas are the sole reality, Berkeley overgeneralized his case and fell into the very error into which materialism had fallen. For the fact remains that there are phenomena which, regardless of the name ascribed to them, must be distinguished from other phenomena and yet related to them. To call reality all mind or all matter is hardly an advantage; for there still remains the problem of accounting for the genuine differences which appear within so-called mind or within so-called matter. It would seem to be the way of wisdom to accept the world of experience as it is, to recognize differences where they exist, and to study the world of experience in scientific fashion in order to describe and relate the different phenomena which are found within it.

Adopting, then, the experimental method of science, we discover first of all that substance, whether material or mental, has no basis in observable facts,—there is no empirical evidence for asserting that a metaphysical substratum to material or mental phenomena exists. Accordingly, we need not feel compelled to say with Berkeley that there is a mind-substance in which are found psychical entities called ideas; and we need not say with Royce that the great task of epistemology is to explain how these subjec-

tive minds can escape from the narrow circle of their own ideas and know something beyond themselves. What an empirical study of experience yields is a more or less organized set of phenomena or events called an organism attempting to maintain itself within a larger system of events called the environment. This environment is not an alien world standing wholly apart from the organism, but is the matrix in which the organism was conceived and the world on which it depends for its very existence.

In short, as living organisms we are already in the most intimate contact with the world of real things, and our intercourse is with it rather than with a subjective world of ideas. Knowledge is not a mental or psychic state, but a functional relationship. The organism knows its environment when it has succeeded in resolving the problem which confronted it. Ideas, as Royce himself asserted, are "plans of action" by means of which the organism attempts to overcome the difficulty confronting it and thus further its own life. The categories of thought are what they are because of the interplay of organism and environment; and because they develop in concrete situations they are always relevant to the situations in which man finds himself just as a hammer is always relevant to carpentering.

If we accept such a realistic, functionalistic view of knowledge, it becomes apparent that recourse to a universal consciousness is unnecessary. Truth and error become perfectly intelligible. They have their source and meaning in human experience, in the interplay between man and his environment. On this view, ideas are instrumental. They arise in situations in which there is tension, conflict, division; and their function is to resolve the conflict. They are called forth for specific purposes. If they fulfill the purposes for which they were called forth, if they live up to their predictions and promises, they are called true. If they disappoint, if they fail, they are called false. A true idea is one that leads to success, to effective manipulation. An erroneous idea is one which leaves us disappointed, dissatisfied, and still confronted with the problem which the idea was expected to resolve.

On this view we can admit with Royce that the idea and its intended object must somehow get together if the truth or falsity of the idea is ever to be determined. But we need not say with him that the two must come together in a universal consciousness. They may and do come together in a future and therefore larger experience of the individual or of mankind in general. And it is in this larger experience of the future that the idea does or does not receive its verification.

It would hardly be just to Royce's position, however, to

dismiss it solely on the grounds that it takes as its point of departure the Berkeleian theory of spiritual substance. For in the course of his argument Royce has tended to put the conception of unchanging substance into the background of his thought and to substitute for it the conceptions of "life" and "process,"—conceptions more in accord with his earlier view concerning the nature of mind.¹ The universal consciousness tends to be spoken of as "the conscious life of the Logos"² and as a "self-completed world-process."³ The conception of the world-mind as unchanging spiritual substance which perceives and has ideas is not completely abrogated, however. In fact it unconsciously assumes the position of basic importance for Royce. For though the universal consciousness is a process it is nonetheless an "eternal," "self-completed" and therefore unchanging process. By oscillating between these two different conceptions of mind, Royce is able to discuss the phenomena of change, evolution, process, etc., at the same time that he speaks of eternal perfection, eternal triumph, etc.,—two sets of facts which he found impossible to harmonize in an earlier stage of his thought.

The result of this two-fold use of the term "mind" is constant confusion and ambiguity. On the one hand thought is taken to be an order immanent in things and constitutional of reality, a pervasive process identical with all its parts; on the other hand, thought is taken to be that which orders, organizes, synthesizes,—a something transcendent and noumenal, an absolute subject which perceives and thinks its objects but is not identical with them.

Royce's attempt to graft activism, dynamism, change, etc., on the conception of mind as unchanging substance; his attempt to combine stability, perfection, triumph, etc., as value categories with change, time, evolution, etc., as categories of science is of profound importance for his entire philosophy and for his conception of God, and must be studied in its proper place. For the present it will be sufficient to point out that Royce's contention that his argument for the existence of God starts from empirically given facts and proceeds by a "purely logical process" can hardly be granted. We fail to find the facts of spiritual substance and psychical ideas as he defines these, and we fail to see the logical inevitableness of an absolute thought if we grant the existence of such indubitable facts as truth and error.

Leaving, then, Royce's alleged proof for the existence of

¹Cf. "Tests of Right and Wrong," F. E., pp. 210-11.

²S. M. P., p. 417.

³Ibid., pp. 321, 421.

an absolute thought, we turn to a study of his second great problem, namely, the transforming of this "passionless eternal insight" into a spirit capable of meeting the demands of our practical life. Our study will lead us first into a re-interpretation of the physical world; second, into a discussion of the nature of the moral realm; third, into an interpretation of the nature of evil; fourth, into a further discussion of the implications of omniscience in the absolute.

The Absolute and the World of Description

Assuming the existence of an absolute thought, says Royce, we are able to give an entirely different interpretation to the world of physical facts. The external world of fact is seen, from the point of view of absolute idealism, to be the phenomenal or symbolical expression of the more ultimately real and divine life of the Logos. The unity and orderliness of the facts of physical nature are viewed as the outer aspect of some deep spiritual unity of will and plan in the world. With Royce as with Kant, the phenomenal world is "the result of an essentially human and finite outlook."¹ It is the more ultimate "world of appreciation" as it appears to one whose consciousness experiences in the forms of space and time and in the categories of physical science. To a being with a conceivably different type of consciousness another kind of phenomenal world would be revealed. The phenomenal order is the common possession of mankind in general and is the world which science studies. It is therefore to be distinguished from the merely subjective world of our private selves. The objective world is that which is describable to and shared by others; the inner world of our subjective selves is non-communicable and private.

Our science, then, does not describe to us the inner nature of things, but only their outer nature as grasped by our human form of consciousness. All the laws, the necessity, the causation, and uniformity which our science attributes to reality belong "not to its inner nature as such, but to the external show of this nature"² as seen by us men. Scientific laws are "inductions about the world as it seems" to us, and do not give us "a theory about the ultimately real world."³

Up to this point Royce has given us an intelligible and acceptable account of the nature of the physical world and of our knowledge of that world. Truth and error are aspects of our human

¹S. M. P., p. 411.

²Ibid., p. 416.

³Ibid., p. 323.

social knowledge and are determined by such human experiences as prediction, verification, and control. But Royce is as little inclined to make truth and error relative to human experience as a whole than he is with making them relative to the private experience of the individual as expressed in the single isolated judgment. True scientific judgments must be really, that is absolutely, true, and false scientific judgments must be really and absolutely false, and so must be related to the judgments of an absolute thought which serves as the standard mind with whose judgments our judgments must conform if they are to be really and absolutely true. Our science is now interpreted by Royce as being "our attempt to imitate the Divine Thought."¹ The criteria of truth are taken to be absolute rationality, absolute universality and consistency.

At this stage of his development Royce does not give us a detailed account as to how these two interpretations of science are to be related. He does not state how a science which aims to control nature² and so make it responsive to human needs can be related to a science which aims to imitate the divine thought. As stated before, the problem of reconciling these two strains, the voluntaristic and the intellectualistic, of his philosophy is one of the crucial points in Royce's system and calls for a detailed and critical analysis. Since Royce faces this question squarely in a later stage of his philosophy, we shall do well to defer our discussion of it till later.

Royce's philosophy of physical nature is not hostile to his philosophy of religion and the conception of God which he is building up. Phenomenal nature is the outer manifestation of a deeply lying spiritual purpose. The orderliness and rigidity of nature are due to the workings of the human mind and are not inherent in the heart of reality. To find the true meaning of nature, therefore, we must delve beneath the outer order and into the recesses of our spiritual life. There is no conflict in Royce's mind between science and religion, because Royce accepts the facts of science as they are and finds it possible to read religion into them.³

¹R. A. P., p. 463.

²Cf. Royce's statement elsewhere that man knows nature "in order to control, not in order to worship" her. (Theistic Interpretation of Nature," The Augustus Graham Lectures on Theism, [1896], Lecture V, 74. The lectures are unpublished.) Cf. also The Conception of God (New York: Macmillan Co., 1897), p. 27.

³Santayana remarks that Royce's religious faith begins "by accepting all facts and all scientific probabilities in order to

The Absolute and the World of Appreciation

In the discussion of the world of description constant reference was made to another and deeper reality of which the outer world is the symbolic expression. It is now necessary to inquire into the nature of this more ultimately real world.

That a type of reality other than that of the world of description exists, says Royce, need hardly be elaborated upon. For it is surely true that in my daily intercourse with my fellows, I am continually coming in contact with a reality that defies my power of physical description.

Now, what manner of reality is this which I attribute to my fellows and which goes to constitute their inner lives? It is a reality which cannot be described, because it is private, inner, and incommunicable, and yet it is a reality whose parts seem to be in some sort of union because they possess and can communicate to each other, a common world of objective phenomena. In fact, the very existence of the world of phenomenal facts presupposes the existence of a community of appreciative beings to whom they can be appreciatively verified.¹ But how can these inner lives be so completely sundered so as not to be describable to each other and yet so akin that they can communicate with each other? Royce's answer is that all this is unintelligible unless we recognize the fact that there is one absolute self of which all finite selves are organic parts and which they live and move and have their being. It is only when we attempt to view the inner lives of our fellows from the point of view of our space and time that we find them inaccessible.

All physical nature stands on the same level; a stone or a tree has the same ontological status as has the body of my friend. There is no real distinction between animate and inanimate nature. The difference between the two is "merely the difference between the nature that like the face of my friend is near enough to our own for us to get a sympathetic suggestion of what appreciative truth it probably embodies, and the nature that like the infinitely complex ether waves which fill the interplanetary spaces is too remote from our own to be appreciable from our point of view."² The reason why physical realities remain objects to us and persons is that we do not understand their language. Physical nature is attempting to communicate with us, but we cannot interpret the meanings of her gestures, words, and conduct as we can

face them religiously." Character and Opinion in the United States (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons Co., 1920), p. 126.

¹S. M. P., p. 407.

²Ibid., p. 427.

those of our fellows. Nor can nature understand us. All of her parts stand related to us as "unresponsive silent partners in this world of an essentially social consciousness."¹ Royce explains this discrepancy between human and other forms of consciousness by means of the conception of "time-span." By this term is meant "the fact that what we call a present moment in our consciousness always has a brief but still by no means infinitesimal length, within which the 'pulse' of change, which that moment apperceives must fall."²

A simple empirical observation of physical facts would never yield this interpretation of the external world. This deeper spiritual principle which we shall identify with God, says Royce, cannot be found in nature when nature is taken in and by itself. God is not to be found in the thunder, the fire, the wind, or the earthquake. "He is no hypothesis of empirical science." Hence, "it behooves religious students to cease looking for the living God among the dead facts of physical science and to betake themselves to their own proper field."³ They must seek the eternal "not in experience, but in the thought that thinks experience."⁴

To solve the problem of the freedom and autonomy of the moral individual Royce reverts to his distinction between the world of description and the world of appreciation and asserts that the spirit of the individual is free in the world of appreciation but that his body is determined in the world of phenomena.

Royce's doctrine that a super-mind exists which is made up of all finite minds and yet is more than all of them is analogous to views held by contemporary physical and biological science and involves no more miraculous element than does it. Moreover, certain details of our mental life do seem to furnish us with situations which are analogous to the situation of such a super-self composed of many selves. Thus, abnormal psychology portrays the phenomenon of a self composed of multiple personality. Again, in deliberation the individual carries on an inner conversation with various inner selves which are taken to be organic parts or

¹"The External World and the Social Consciousness," Philosophical Review, III, 543. Cf. also, The World and the Individual, II, 207: "We have no right whatever to speak of really unconscious Nature, but only of uncommunicative Nature. . . ."

²"Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature," Studies of Good and Evil, p. 243. This book referred to below as S. G. E.

³S. M. P., p. 348; R. A. P., p. 285.

⁴R. A. P., p. 289.

moments of the real true self; and just as our reflective states include our sense-data without displacing or altering them, so the superself might be conceived as using the sense-data of various individual experiences without having to have additional sense-organs of its own. Because such a super mind is at least conceivably possible, it will not do to dismiss it in cavalier fashion and relegate it to the realm of superstition.¹

An initial difficulty, however, confronts such a view, namely, that of explaining what type of thinking, feeling, willing, enjoying, etc., is possible for such a mind. Royce faces this difficulty squarely, but, as our criticism will attempt to point out, he becomes enmeshed in a host of ambiguities. Before considering these, it will be well to have the remainder of Royce's doctrine of this period before us.

The Absolute and the Problem of Evil

The absolute and the problem of moral evil.- The cue to a solution of the problem of moral evil Royce finds in a "wondrous experience," namely, that of confronting evil and overcoming it. Royce takes as an example an evil impulse. Considered in itself, it is something hateful and horrible,—something which has no place in a morally good order. But suppose this evil impulse is resisted and overpowered. Then, says Royce, "in this moment of hating and condemning it I make it a part of my larger moral goodness. The justification of the existence of my evil impulse comes just at the instant when I hate and condemn it. Condemning and conquering the evil will makes it a part of a good will."² It is only because there are evil impulses that the good will can have any existence in the finite consciousness. "The moral insight condemns the evil that it experiences; and in condemning and conquering this evil it forms and is, together with the evil, the organic total that constitutes the good will. Only through this inner victory over the evil that is experienced as a conquered tendency does the good will have its being."³

¹Cf. William James in A Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1911), pp. 289-92: since "the self-compounding of mind in its smaller and more accessible portions seems a certain fact . . . the speculative assumption of a similar but wider compounding . . . must be reckoned with as a legitimate hypothesis. The absolute is not the impossible being I once thought it."

²S. M. P., p. 453; italics Royce's.

³R. A. P., p. 452; italics Royce's.

The problem of moral evil in so far as it relates to God is solved in like manner by Royce. The analysis of the experience in which an evil impulse is overcome and made an organic part of a greater good will reveals to us how evil can be a necessary part of a greater good. This finite human experience, says Royce, is identical in kind with the divine experience. "In our simple good acts we have thus the specimen of the eternal realization of goodness."¹ God's goodness is not constituted by a lack of knowledge of evil, for such a goodness would be mere innocence. God's goodness is genuine moral goodness and is achieved through an eternal triumphing over evil.

A further question remains to be answered, namely, What is the relation of the wilful sinner in whom the evil impulse is not overcome to the absolutely perfect life of God? What is the relation of our actually committed sins, as distinguished from the potential sins which we have overcome, to the absolutely good Whole. Royce's reply is as follows: If my evil deeds were isolated facts, existing in utter detachment, they would be absolutely evil. But the fact is that my evil deed is "no lonesome fact in the world, but is an element in the organic life of God."² "In God, so we may say to the wilful sinner, you are a part of a good will, which bears just such organic relation to your sinfulness as, in a good man, his virtue bears to the impulse that forms a part of his goodness. The hatred and condemnation of just your life and character makes God holy."³ Again, "As the evil impulse is to the good man so is the evil will of the wicked man to the life of God in which he is an element."⁴

The absolute and the problem of physical evil.- With this solution of the problem of moral evil before him, Royce turns next to the problem of physical evil. The problem, as it presented itself to Job was this: Why does an omnipotent and perfect God permit the existence of suffering and tragedy in his world?

If we grant Job's presupposition that God is a being other than his world, that he is the external creator of the world, then the problem of evil is indeed insoluble, says Royce. A satisfactory answer to the question which appalled Job requires another point of departure. It is this: "God is not in ultimate essence another being than yourself, He is the Absolute Being. You truly are one with God, part of his life. He is the very soul of your soul."⁵ If this be the case, then our finite experiences are

¹Ibid., p. 453.

²Ibid., p. 454.

³S. M. P., p. 460; italics Royce's.

⁴R. A. P., p. 455.

⁵"The Problem of Job," S. G. E., p. 14.

God's experiences. Thus, "When you suffer, your sufferings are God's sufferings, In you God himself suffers, precisely as you do, and has all your concern in overcoming this grief."¹

But why does a God who need not suffer still choose to suffer? "The sole possible, necessary, and sufficient answer is, Because without suffering, without ill, without woe, evil, tragedy, God's life could not be perfected."² Just as the existence of moral evil makes possible God's moral perfection, so does the existence of physical evil make possible the ideally perfect and triumphant life of God. Without defeat in time, triumph and victory in Eternity would be impossible.

The Absolute as Possessing Other Attributes

It is in an essay entitled "The Conception of God" which was delivered in California in the year 1895 that Royce attempts to point out the larger implications of the divine thought. This essay, however, still stresses the cognitive element of God's nature and relies upon the same type of argument for proof of God's existence as did The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. In the essay, however, Royce shifts from the term "absolute thought" to that of "absolute experience" more in keeping with the phraseology of Bradley's Appearance and Reality.

Royce analyzes this absolute experience as follows: The Absolute, says Royce, is a being who finds his absolute system of thought fulfilled in a completely organized and whole experience. Whereas in finite beings ideas are so frequently divorced from facts and experience—it is this which causes the finite mind to question and to have ideas—in the Absolute all ideas are completely fulfilled in an absolute and all-inclusive system of experience. It is this fact which constitutes the basis of the omniscience of the Absolute.³ Omniscience, moreover, implies the presence in God of other attributes. In the first place, God is omnipotent in that he constitutes the truth and reality of things,—he is "world-possessing" and thus the determiner of all experience. Likewise, he is a self, for this absolute experience "beholds the fulfilment of its own thinking, and views the determined character of its living experience as identical with what its universal conception mean."⁴ Again, it is a One and a Whole. That it is a One we know from the fact that it exists "as all-inclusive, as determined by nothing beyond itself, as assured of the complete fulfilment of its own ideas concerning what it

¹Ibid., p. 14.

²Ibid., p. 14.

³Conception of God, pp. 15-16.

⁴Ibid., p. 45.

is." That it is a Whole is seen from the fact that "An Omniscient Being would have to have present to himself all the conceivable relations amongst facts, so that in his world nothing would be fragmentary, disunited, confused, unrelated. There would be endless variety in this whole, but the whole, as such, would fulfil an all-embracing unity, a single system of ideas."¹

The conception of God as omniscient involves, thus, the conceptions of God as "Absolute Self," "Absolute Thought," "Absolute Experience." All of these, says Royce, equally reveal the nature of the divine being. Moreover, and here Royce departs from his former attitude of indifference as to the similarity of his conception of God to that of traditional Christianity,² it is necessary to give to this conception of God both a theistic and a pantheistic interpretation. "It is not the conception of any Unconscious Reality, into which finite beings are absorbed; nor of a Universal Substance, in whose law our ethical independence is lost; nor of an Ineffable Mystery, which we can only silently adore. On the contrary, every ethical predicate that the highest religious faith of the past has attributed to God is capable of exact interpretation in terms of our present view."³ Royce affirms that "what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is, despite all the blindness and accidents of religious tradition, identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy."⁴

As stated before, Royce's doctrine of an absolute self composed of finite selves, or of an absolute experience composed of all finite experiences, is by no means inconceivable. But difficulties appear the moment Royce undertakes to fill in the detail of his theory, when he attempts to show just what are the type of experiences which the absolute has. Because the issue raised by these difficulties relates to the religious and moral value of Royce's conception of God, the problem of overcoming these diffi-

¹Ibid., p. 15.

²Cf. R. A. P., p. 447: "And now we must add that we are quite indifferent whether anybody calls all this Theism or Pantheism."

³"The Conception of God," p. 49. This essay, together with certain critical remarks by Professors Mezes, Le Conte, and Howison and a supplementary essay entitled "The Absolute and the Individual" were published in book form under the title The Conception of God. The quotations already met with are taken from the book, referred to below as C. G.

⁴C. G., p. 50.

culties constitutes a major problem and a crucial point for Royce's idea of God. For if he cannot attribute to the absolute a type of experience which is intelligible to finite men then the absolute remains an ineffable mystery rather than a being with whom the religious consciousness may have a personal and intelligible relation.

The difficulties attending Royce's attempt to put a meaningful content into his conception of God are derived from the more basic difficulty attending Royce's endeavor to attribute both temporal and eternal categories to the absolute. As stated above¹ Royce wishes to find a place in his philosophical system for the scientific categories of change, progress, growth, etc., and also for the value categories of eternal triumph, perfection, realization, etc. In order to harmonize these two sets of categories, he asserts that, on the one hand, the absolute lives a life that is complete, eternal, and perfect, and, on the other, the absolute experiences our problems, difficulties, sorrows, etc., as genuinely as do we mortals who live in the world of time. Because Royce's discussion of time and eternity and their relation to each other is so central in his philosophy, it is necessary to direct attention upon it.

Psychology teaches, says Royce, that our time experience is not that of an indivisible mathematical instant, but is an experience of passage or succession. Parts of this succession come to us as present wholes in the sense that they are known all at once within a "specious present" or "time-span." Impressions received during this time are simultaneously present in consciousness and are known all at once as a present totality. Similarly, says Royce, the absolute consciousness experiences a "specious present" which embraces the whole of temporal reality—past, present and future—in a direct and immediate experience. The example which Royce continually employs is that of a musical melody. "A sequence of chords is not a mere series of events to you whose earlier moments are non-existent when the later are there. The whole series is one artistic moment to you."²

It is true that the individual has a direct and immediate experience of a time-span. He can hold in consciousness more than a mere instant of time, he can hold in consciousness a succession of instants and grasp them as a totality which is now immediately experienced. But to admit this fact with Royce does not compel one to admit Royce's further contention that the time-span of the absolute which contains all time is identical in kind with finite

¹Cf. above, p. 21.

²S. M. P., p. 431.

time-spans,—the difference being "merely one of span."¹ For in the time-span of a finite being the future is future precisely because of the fact that it is not now, or ever has been, immediately experienced. If it were already present and contemporaneous in consciousness with the present, it simply would not be the future but part of the specious present. Indeed, if the future were already present together with the past, it is doubtful if a present could even be spoken of at all. For a present is always known and experienced in terms of past and future events which are not immediately and directly experienced.

Royce's difficulty seems to lie in his confusing the time-transcendence of the mathematical instant by the immediately experienced specious present with another kind of time-transcendence of which he also speaks, namely, that which is experienced in an act of reflection. "Every being who is rationally conscious of time, is, by that very fact, living in part out of the world of time. For what we know we transcend."² This confusion appears in Royce's discussion of the melody. He speaks of experiencing the melody as "the whole sequence" and "not a mere series of events whose earlier moments are non-existent when the later are there."³ Now it is necessary to point out that the melody as a whole is not grasped in a direct and immediate experience. A musical succession can be grasped as a whole only after it has been played through an actual stretch of time involving past, present, and future. And then it is grasped, not in a direct and immediate way, but in a symbolic way,—not in the form of actual music but in the form of thought which has been abstracted from the perceptual occurrence. It is grasped in ideal fashion and as signifying something. "It becomes," as Royce says, "an artistic moment to you";⁴ "we are aware of some significance, of some ideal value, in the series of states as a whole";⁵ we make "a transcendent spiritual estimate of all time."⁶ Royce seemingly is confusing our grasping the whole melody as "some ideal value" with our grasping the melody as "the whole sequence." As a matter of fact, however, the two must be carefully distinguished. In reflection, the past and future may be present but only as conceptual abstractions. They are never present as immediately experienced as they must be if they are to be parts of an eternal time-span. Neither

¹The World and the Individual (New York: Macmillan Co., 1900-1902), II, 145.

²"Implications of Self-Consciousness," S. G. E., p. 168.

³S. M. P., p. 431.

⁴Ibid., p. 431.

⁵Ibid., p. 431.

⁶Ibid., p. 432.

of these experiences of time-transcendence makes intelligible to us the time-transcending experience of the absolute in which all time is actually and directly experienced as a totum simul.

Royce's ambiguity concerning time and eternity is far-reaching and subverts a considerable part of his conception of God. Thus he asserts that the absolute as absolute can experience such facts as thought, doubt, ignorance, pain, suffering, defeat, strife, etc. He says, for example, that "when you suffer, your sufferings are God's sufferings," that the defeats and tragedies of finite life are tasted with all their bitterness and in all their genuineness by God. But it is difficult to see how such experiences are possible for the absolute. They are possible for finite beings because in the life of human beings there is a temporal interval between the defeat and the subsequent triumph, between the ignorance and the knowledge which will eliminate it, between the suffering and the impending good. But in the absolute, there are no such temporal intervals since everything is experienced as a totum simul. And so it is difficult to understand how a present defeat can be experienced as a genuine defeat by the absolute when the victory is also present, or how a doubt can be a genuine doubt when the knowledge which overcomes it is already present.

Thus, instead of being wealthier and richer in content than finite experience, it would seem that the absolute experience is void of content or else contains it in a sense utterly foreign to finite beings. This latter alternative seems to be inadvertently admitted by Royce when he speaks of the experience of the absolute as a "superhuman experience, of which ours would then seem to be only the remote hint."¹ This statement would seem to indicate that his position is really similar to that of Bradley, but Royce bends all his energy to the task of avoiding the doctrine to which the logic of his position would lead him, in order to save for his conception of God a moral and religious value.

¹C. G., p. 12.

CHAPTER III

GOD AS A WILLING, SELF-CONSCIOUS, MORAL INDIVIDUAL INCLUSIVE OF FINITE MORAL AGENTS

At the time the California address was presented, opportunity was given for criticism of Royce's conception of God. The burden of the criticism was that Royce's view left no place for free moral agents. Royce's argument appeared to "confine us to a single and sole infinite Inclusive Self, and reduce all particular so-called selves merely to modes of his omniscient Perceptive Conception."¹ God appears as "the one and only real agent—the vera causa sola."² In fact, the status of "will," both in God and in finite individuals, is left in a very uncertain state,—and with it the status of divine and finite personality. It thus becomes incumbent on Royce to define more clearly the place and significance of the moral individual in his philosophical system. It is in the essay entitled "The Absolute and the Individual"³ which appeared as a supplementary essay to the California address that Royce first attempts to state his position concerning the relation of God to finite moral individuals. This attempt is continued along the same lines in his magnum opus, The World and the Individual,⁴ which, with the supplementary essay, go to constitute the important writings of the third period of Royce's thought.

The factor which proved helpful to Royce in his attempt to answer the questions provoked by his doctrine of God was the new psychology of James with its doctrines that the distinctive characteristic of ideas is purpose and that the essential nature of will is attention. The former doctrine had already made its appearance in certain of Royce's early writings, but the latter appears for the first time in the supplementary essay to the California address as an aid to the solution of the problem of individuality.

¹Cf. G. H. Howison, "The City of God, and the True God as its Head," The Conception of God, pp. 79-132. The quotation is from pp. 129-30.

²Ibid., p. 130.

³The Conception of God, pp. 135-354.

⁴Referred to below as W. and I.

God as Absolute Will

The first question with which Royce deals is: Why is the absolute Thought fulfilled in just this system of absolute experience? Why does the Absolute Experience have just this content rather than another? The presence of just this world cannot be accounted for on the basis of absolute thought alone, for, so far as thought is concerned, any logically possible world is acceptable, and there is no ground for asserting the superior worth or acceptableness of this world. A new factor in the Absolute seems to be called for, says Royce, "whereby the unity of the Absolute Consciousness gets its positive definition and its individuality."¹ It is for this reason that Royce says: "To define the Absolute as the Omniscient Being, or as the All-knowing Moment, or Instant, is, as I hold, the best beginning for an idealistic doctrine. But I do not regard such a definition as other than a beginning."² The factor which Royce introduces into his absolute in order to account for its preference for just this world is "will." To show how "will" is responsible for the existence of this world rather than for that of another is Royce's immediate task.

The absolute will and the existence of the world.- Rejecting the psychology which finds the essential nature of will in the three factors of desire, choice, and efficacious effort, Royce accepts the doctrine of James that the fundamental element in will is attention. Will is defined by Royce "as a process involving attention to one conscious content rather than to another, or, on higher levels, as the preference of a datum attended to, as over against data that remain, relatively speaking, merely ideal or possible objects of attention."³

Applying this definition of will to Will as it exists in the Absolute we find the solution of our problem. In the Absolute, to attend involves "the act of finding a universal type, or idea, exemplified by a datum of experience while other possible data, that might exemplify this general type, are, relatively speaking, ignored."⁴

Moreover, the fact that the Absolute selected just this world is an indication that this world was preferred by him; that from the point of view of God this world has a value such as no other abstractly possible world could have. Otherwise the question as to why just this world was selected by him in fulfillment of his ideas still remains unanswered. And this fact leads to the conclusion that Will involves more than mere attention,—it

¹C. G., p. 186.

²Ibid., p. 186.

³Ibid., p. 192. Italics Royce's.

⁴Ibid., p. 200.

also involves preference or love. "The selection of this world as the fulfilment of absolute ideas and ideals would involve, then, an unexplained element. This element is precisely the one that might be expressed as the actual Divine Love for this world."¹ The Divine Will selects its object not because it experiences it, or knows it, but because it prefers or loves it.

The absolute will and the eternal completeness of God.-

However, granted that the Absolute Will, by an act of attention and love, selects just this fulfilment of its ideas; why is it not possible for the Absolute to continue thinking about other abstractly possible fulfilments, and so remain eternally incomplete? To answer this question Royce again uses the conception of will to bring completeness and wholeness to his Absolute and to make more intelligible the conception of the "Eternal Now."

Our finite experience is always incomplete and imperfect. In the first place, the ideas and questions which arise in our minds are never fully answered by the content of our experience. On the other hand, the content of our experience seems to be too full for our ideas so that we cannot fully fathom it. In short, our experience seems to be incomplete both as to its content and as to its ideas.

That the Absolute cannot be incomplete in the second sense is apparent from the fact that it is the All-Knower having a system of ideas which is always adequate to whatever experience there is. The difficulty arises in respect to the adequacy of experience. Why may not the Absolute have ideas of experiences which are never actualized in concrete form,—ideas of all manner of possible experience? And so, why is not the Absolute involved in an endless perusal of possibilities,—a perusal which makes completeness of thought forever impossible.

Royce finds the solution of this problem in the nature of the hypothetical judgment contrary to fact. The so-called unrealized possibility is actually realized in experience in the differentiation of one individual from another. It is because a certain possibility is not realized that a given situation is what it is. Hence the so-called unrealized possibility really exists in the realized actuality and helps to make the world what it is. Thus, if the Persians had won at Marathon, then Europe would have been more nearly like Asia. But the individuality and uniqueness of European civilization is what it is because the Greeks and not the Persians won at Marathon.

¹C. G., pp. 215-16. Italics Royce's.

The absolute will and its relation to the absolute thought.— In the preceding stage of his thought Royce definitely asserted that the element of thought was the primary factor in the nature of the Absolute.¹ In this period, however, thought gradually assumes a position subordinate to that of will. For though the attentive process is to fulfil ideas, it is in no way determined by ideas as to what particular fulfilment it shall give to ideas. The ideas are helpless in the face of will,—the latter is absolutely free to attend to and select whatever it wishes.

God as Individual

So far in all of his discussions, Royce has implied that finite individuals exist and also that the absolute as absolute is an individual. But up to this point he has given no definition or principle of individuality.² But Royce has now reached a stage in the presentation of his conception of God in which it is necessary to face the problem of the individual and to state clearly the status of the individual in his metaphysical system.

The individual as object of "exclusive interest."— Royce declares that the essential feature of individuality is not segmentation but uniqueness. Uniqueness, however, is word of great subtlety and needs to be carefully studied,—what determines uniqueness and how can it be known?

From the side of knowledge, we know an individual as such because of our exclusive interest in it. And the metaphysical reality of the individual also depends upon its being the object of an exclusive interest. The world as a whole is an individual because it is this world and none other which the Absolute desires from all the abstractly possible worlds as the fulfilment of its ideas. The Absolute has an "exclusive love" for this world.

¹Cf. the following statement: "But in insisting upon thought as the first category of the divine Reason, I myself am not at all minded to lose sight of the permanent, although in the order of logical dependence, secondary, significance of the moral categories, or of their eternal place in the world of the completed self." ("Implications of Self-Consciousness," S. G. E.)

²In the early stage of his thought that which distinguished the ego from the alter was a "feeling of interest" or of vividness (cf. above, page 6). In the next period, the principle of individuation appears to be finite thought. The absolute thought "cuts itself up" into a world of finite individual thinkers with different time-spans of consciousness. (Cf. R. A. P., p. 194).

Likewise, the objects within the world are individuals by virtue of the same fact. "Objects are individuals in so far as they are unique expressions of essentially exclusive ideals, ends, Divine decrees."¹

The individual as possessing a life-plan.- If Royce were to apply to the Absolute the principle of individuation which we have been considering, it would seem that the Absolute attains to individuality only on the basis that it loves and prefers itself to the exclusion of all others. But Royce nowhere says this. Rather, he brings in another principle of individuality, namely, that of unity, of organization, of plan, and makes this principle the basis of moral individuality in respect to both the Absolute and the finite human being.

"It is by an individuating or exclusive interest in living one life for one purpose, that a man becomes a moral individual, one Self, and not a mere collection of empirical social contrast-effects."² The same holds true of the Absolute. The Absolute is an individual, in fact, "the only ultimately real individual" and it is an individual because it "embodies one Will, and realizes this will in the unity of its one life."³

The fact that the goal of the absolute is eternally realized brings to the fore a difficulty attending Royce's use of the term "will." A finite will is a mental process which arises in response to various impulses, cravings, desires, which seek something which they do not now have. The finite will seeks so to alter present conditions as to make possible future satisfaction of desire. Where satisfaction is already present as it is for the absolute in his eternally finished world, it is difficult to understand how a "will," as we finite beings know it, can exist. In the experience of the absolute in which all goals are attained, all desires fulfilled, and for which is eternal and perfect satisfaction, the existence of processes of will is as little comprehensible as is the existence of processes of thought in an experience where thought has eternally found its object. "Will" as well as "thought" is used in a sense foreign to finite beings. A finished world is not compatible with the nature of will as we experience will.

God as Self-Conscious Moral Ego

Self-consciousness as "social contrast-effect."- Royce has still to show that these individuals who are in process of realiz-

¹C. G., p. 267.

²Ibid., p. 264.

³Ibid., p. 272.

ing goals are at the same time self-conscious individuals, for individuality, as defined by Royce, and self-consciousness are not necessarily identical terms. In order for a self-conscious self to emerge, says Royce, there must be a social environment, that is, an environment of other selves. It is when the individual comes in contact with these other selves and becomes aware of them as persons with feelings, volitions, thoughts, etc., that he becomes aware of himself as an individual self with like feelings, hopes, aspirations, etc.

Man as finite self-conscious moral ego.- The self of which one becomes conscious, says Royce, cannot be identified with the passing psychological states of our empirical self. For these states change and shift with each passing moment, while my Self, that is, my real Self, is of a deeper unity and durability. And the factor which brings this unity and stability into my life, in fact, the factor which creates me as a Self as contrasted with the passing psychological content of the empirical self, is the factor mentioned above. It is "the presence of an ideal of what, amidst all the confusion of my life, I mean to be."¹ The empirical ego of an individual is simply the sum-total of his conscious mental states; but, "His metaphysically real Ego is constituted by his experiences in so far as they mean for him the struggle towards his one ideal."²

God as divine self-conscious moral being.- If our account of the emergence of self-consciousness be true; if selfhood depends upon "social contrast-effect,"³ then it would appear that the Absolute can not be a conscious self. For our whole discussion of the previous chapters has tended to show that the Absolute, with its Thought, Experience, and Will, forms "one unity of consciousness," or "one moment or instant of fulfilled life."⁴ Hence there is no Alter or Other over against which the Absolute Whole can be placed and contrasted.

The Absolute, as Absolute, says Royce, is self-conscious and in precisely the same way as is the finite human being. For the Absolute, though a "unity of consciousness" is a unity which involves a diversity. For the Absolute, while a "thinking Self," is also: a "Self experiencing data," a "Seer" who sees the Thought fulfilled in the Experience, and a "Will whereby the Absolute Thinker is arrested in his thinking of bare abstract possibilities in order to attain to concrete individuality. We have,

¹C. G., p. 282.

²Ibid., p. 291.

³Ibid., p. 296.

⁴Ibid., p. 298.

thus, what might be called an "organism of interrelated Selves"¹ or "functions."² There are, then, four persons, or "Divine fellows"³ in the Godhead, and these stand related to each other as Self and Alter. Thus our psychology which tells us that self-consciousness can arise only in a social environment holds true also in the experience of the Absolute.

This position of Royce, however, need not go unchallenged. Throughout his previous argument, Royce has attempted to impress us with the fact of unity, of absolute oneness in his "theory of the Organic Whole."⁴ Suddenly, however, Royce shifts from the theory of the One Absolute with many functions to that of an Absolute of many selves, and assumes an identity between function and self. But such an identity has no analogy in human experience and is without any empirical warrant whatever. By no stretch of the imagination can we identify function with self. The only self which we know in human experience is always a self with diverse functions, and the emergence of self-consciousness is dependent not upon diversity of function but upon a plurality of selves each with a diversity of function.

A further complication arises in the position that God is a moral being from the fact that since the Absolute is eternally perfect, the ideal which it has is at the same time eternally realized. For human beings, goals and ideals are yet to be attained, they are possibilities to be striven for. For God, however, "there are no genuine possibilities unfulfilled; no true ideas that hover above reality as bare possibilities."⁵ The question thus arises: Can God be "moral" in any sense intelligible to human beings?

Royce's assertion, then, that "every ethical predicate that the highest religious faith of the past has attributed to God is capable of exact interpretation in terms of our present view"⁶ is hardly warranted. The Absolute of Royce's system cannot be moral in any sense in which we mortals regard the meaning of the term "moral," nor can it even be considered as an individual since it has no unfulfilled plan for which it strives. The more consistent view would seem to be that held by Bosanquet, and at times by Royce himself, that either the Absolute or the finite, but not both, is to be regarded as an individual,—and the preference goes to the Absolute while we mortals are reduced to hapless bits of this Infinite Self.

¹C. G., p. 300.

²Ibid., pp. 301, 302.

³Ibid., p. 302.

⁴Ibid., p. 329.

⁵Ibid., p. 323.

⁶Ibid., p. 50.

The Relation of God and the Finite Moral Being

The temporal relations of God and man.- We have already seen wherein the uniqueness and individuality of moral selves lie. Each individual is an individual from the point of view of the Absolute in that his life is the object of an "exclusive interest" of the Absolute. And because each individual is the object of a different exclusive interest of the Absolute, it follows that each individual is distinct. Moreover, each individual is a unique self from his own point of view because he is consciously struggling toward and reaching his own ideal. And it is for these reasons, says Royce, that we can say that the individuality and uniqueness of the individual are as real as the moral order requires them to be.

In comment, it should be pointed out that the moral order requires more than that the individual should merely have a plan. It is necessary that that plan be one of the individual's own choosing, for only then can the individual be held morally responsible for the worthwhileness of the plan and for the acts which result from the attempt to realize it. Royce apparently recognizes this fact and so in certain places says that the goal is set by the individual.¹ But such an admission runs counter to Royce's absolutism and seems to be logically precluded. And, in other passages, Royce indicates "that this individual's plan is identically a part of God's own attentively selected and universal plan."² The conclusion would seem to be, thus, that it is the Absolute and not the individual that determines the plan of the latter, and hence the finite being cannot be held morally responsible for the goodness or badness of his goal and for the consequences which result from his attempts to attain it.

The eternal relations of God and man.³- Finally, Royce discusses the relation of the absolute and the individual in a possible world hereafter. At death "something with a meaning comes to an end before that meaning is worked out to its completion, or is expressed with its intended individual wholeness."⁴ Now "is this seeming interruption the true temporal end of the Ego? If so, of course, the individual Ego remains with its ideal unfilled, with its possibilities unrealized. For in this life the finite Ego is only a seeker of its goal, as a knight of his quest."⁵

¹C. G., pp. 273, 332.

²Ibid., p. 292.

³Ibid., pp. 322 ff. Cf. also: The Conception of Immortality (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1900), entire; W. and I., II, Chapter 10.

⁴W. and I., II, 439.

⁵C. G., p. 322.

Royce finds that the answer to this question is very nigh. For if the individual's goal is at the same time an ideal of the Absolute, and if for God there are no unfulfilled ideals, it would seem that the individual's goal is somehow already realized. And this is precisely the case says Royce: "The inevitable result seems to be, that, just in so far as the moral Ego is really unfulfilled in this life, there is another finite life in the universe, consciously continuous with this one, which, when taken together with this one, consciously reaches the here unattainable goal of this individual, moral Ego, so that, in the universe, the individual is perfected in his own kind."¹

Royce's doctrine concerning the eternal selfhood of the finite individual is not without ambiguity. On the one hand, the moral ego is always "unfulfilled." Realization or fulfilment of one's ego in time would mean the annihilation of the self as a moral individual. In short, to be immortal as an individual is to have a goal forever unattained. On the other hand, the aim is attained in eternity. "In Eternity all is done, and we too rest from our labors. In Time there is no end to the individual ethical task."² But if eternity is simply the sum-total of all time as Royce asserts, it is difficult to comprehend how the individual can be at one and the same time, both realized and unrealized. It would seem that Royce is attempting to harmonize two incompatible terms. Royce admits the difficulty so long as we remain "on this shoal of time." He contents himself with asserting that "our temporal categories are wholly inadequate to express the ultimate facts of an eternal life."³

Restatement of the Argument for the Existence of God;

The Internal and External Meanings of Ideas

In the conception of God which Royce is defending in this period of his thought, the factors of will and individuality play an important part. In The World and the Individual Royce attempts to justify his view on the basis of epistemology. In the preface to this work he says: "The present is a deliberate effort to bring into synthesis, more fully than I have ever done before, the relations of Knowledge and Will in our conception of God. The center of the present discussion is, for this very reason, the true meaning and place of the concept of Individuality. . . ."⁴

¹C. G., p. 323.

²W. and I., II, 444 ff.

³C. G., p. 326.

⁴The World and the Individual, I, ix-x.

Recent psychology and popular belief, Royce continues, serve to bring the dual nature of ideas into bold relief. Recent psychology, with its emphasis upon the behavior and motor aspects of our mental life, has laid bare the volitional aspect of the idea. It has revealed that ideas are never "mere images" of external objects, but involve active responses to the things of which one has ideas. They are, to use Professor Stout's phrase, "plans of actions." "Your idea of your friend differs from your idea of your enemy," says Royce, "by virtue of your consciousness of your different attitude and intended behavior toward these objects."¹ This purposive aspect of the idea Royce calls its "Internal Meaning."² On the other hand, popular belief and various theories of knowledge have always held that ideas are images which somehow represent or picture a reality external to itself. This representative aspect of the idea Royce calls its "External Meaning."³

If we are to lay claim to an adequate theory of knowledge we must somehow solve the problem as to the true meaning and relation of external and internal meanings. As we shall see, Royce finds the solution of that problem in the fact that the internal and external meanings of ideas are at bottom identical. "The external meaning is only apparently external, and, in very truth, is but an aspect of the completely developed internal meaning."⁴ The doctrine of being which results from this theory of ideas is, to quote Royce, "that what is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."⁵

Because a doctrine of knowledge finds its center in a theory of truth, we shall do well, says Royce, to take as point of departure for our discussion the ordinarily accepted definition of truth, namely, as "that about which we judge," and, "the correspondence between our ideas and their objects."⁶ We shall analyze each of these definitions and see whither the argument leads us.

In turning to our first definition of truth, we are at once involved in theory of judgment. "To judge," says Royce, "is to judge about the Real."⁷ Or, expressed in terms of internal and external meanings, "It is to consider internal meanings with reference to external meanings. It is to bring the what into rela-

¹Ibid., p. 22.

²Ibid., p. 24.

³Ibid., p. 26.

⁴Ibid., p. 36.

⁵Ibid., p. 339. Italics Royce's.

⁶Ibid., p. 270.

⁷Ibid., p. 273.

tion with the that."¹ "The what is abstractly universal. The that is individual."² Since, then, judgment involves a relation between these, we must consider in detail the nature of that relation.

In the first place, says Royce, we can state on the basis of our analysis of the historical conceptions of being, that internal and external meanings cannot be sundered without each of them being rendered meaningless. The very nature of judgment, in fact, indicates our belief that internal and external meanings belong together and are inseparably joined. Every judgment "is an effort to link afresh what it all the time, also, seems to keep apart."³ The inseparability of internal and external meanings is further in evidence when we consider the goal of our judging process. In the universal judgment we find that the internal meaning has only a negative relation to the external meaning. Universal judgments "tell us indirectly what is in the realm of external meaning; but only by first telling us what is not."⁴ Our particular judgments to which we appeal in order to give greater determinateness to the meanings of universal judgments by means of external experience⁵ are themselves indeterminate and unsatisfactory. "The defect of these judgments is that they never tell us, by themselves, precisely what object this existant instance of an A that is B really is. . . ."⁶ We can never, by means of them, know an object so that we can know it to be unique in the universe. Our finite experience "never shows us what we, above all, regard as the Real, namely, the Individual fact."⁷ It is in the individual judgment that our goal would be realized. "The limit or goal of this process would be an individual judgment wherein the will expressed its own final determination."⁸ Only in such a judgment do the internal and external meanings come together and does the will expressed in the idea become fully determinate and completed. But this type of judgment which "is conclusive of the search for perfection"⁹ is never vouchsafed the finite individual.¹⁰

Furthermore, asserts Royce, internal and external meanings are related in reciprocal fashion. The meaning of the one helps

¹Ibid., p. 273. Italics Royce's.

²Ibid., p. 294. Italics Royce's.

³Ibid., p. 273.

⁴Ibid., p. 277.

⁵Ibid., pp. 282-83.

⁶Ibid., p. 283. Italics Royce's.

⁷Ibid., p. 297.

⁸Ibid., p. 332.

⁹Ibid., p. 339.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 297.

to determine the meaning of the other. The "object" is one of "conscious selection"¹ and therefore "must be somewhat predetermined by your meaning."² On the other hand, our fragmentary internal meanings seek the "object" in order that they "shall get some sort of final fulfilment."³

It should be noted, too, says Royce, that the external meaning is subordinate to the internal meaning notwithstanding the fact that our internal meanings or thoughts appeal to external experience to get their fulfilment. For "our will has its limitless opportunity to 'try again'; and external experience never finally disposes of ideas unless the ideas themselves make, for reasons defensible upon the ground of internal meaning only, their own 'reasonable' surrender."⁴

The net results of our analysis of the first definition of truth, thus, are: first, further confirmation of the fact that internal and external meanings cannot be kept asunder but that their linkage is "the deepest fact about the universe";⁵ second, that the Real is revealing itself as "that which is immediately beyond the whole of our series of possible efforts to bring, by any process of finite experience and of merely general conception, our own internal meaning to a complete determination."⁶

It is now necessary to turn to a consideration of what commonsense believes is our most important relation to reality, namely, the correspondence of our ideas with reality. This consideration brings us face to face with the second definition of truth, namely the correspondence of our ideas with their objects. In this definition of truth we find ourselves confronted with two obscure relations, namely, What is meant by the relation called correspondence? and, What goes to constitute the relation called having an object?

Recent psychology, says Royce, has thrown considerable light upon the first relation. The idea itself determines what kind of correspondence it is going to have with its object. There is no single kind or degree of correspondence, but there are many, e.g., the kinds of correspondence purposed by such objects as maps, numbers in a ledger, photographs, etc. These are all said to correspond with some other actual, external object, but the kind of correspondence is different in each case. Now, in what way or in what sense an idea is to correspond with its object is determined entirely by the purpose which the idea embodies. And

¹Ibid., p. 31.

²Ibid., p. 282.

³Ibid., p. 284.

⁴Ibid., p. 297.

⁵Ibid., p. 299.

⁶Ibid., p. 299.

the idea is true if it has the correspondence which it intended to have with its object. "Is the correspondence reached between idea and object the precise correspondence that the idea itself intended? If it is, the idea is true. If it is not, the idea is in so far false. Thus it is not mere agreement, but intended agreement, that constitutes truth."¹ "There is no purely external criterion of truth. . . . Ideas are like tools. They are there for an end. They are true, as the tools are good, precisely by reason of their adjustment to this end."²

We ask, next, What is meant by the relation having an object? We cannot say, says Royce, that the object is the cause of the idea, for there are numerous instances in which it is obviously impossible for the object of the idea to have caused it, e.g., when that object is something which no longer exists. The key to the solution of this problem also lies in the concept of purpose or intention. The idea has as its object that which it intends to have—it selects its own object. "If I have meant to make an assertion about Caesar, you must not call me to account because my statement does not correspond, in the intended way, with the object called Napoleon."³ Just as the sort of correspondence which an idea is going to have with an object is determined entirely by the internal meaning of the idea, so the object which the idea is going to have is determined solely by the internal meaning.

Does not this present us with a fatal difficulty, asks Royce, the difficulty namely of accounting for the possibility of error? If the idea determines both the type of correspondence and the object to which it is to correspond, is not truth mere tautology and is not error excluded in advance?⁴ This difficulty Royce overcomes by recalling to our minds the inseparable relation between internal and external meanings. In seeking an external meaning, the internal meaning is seeking only itself but itself as more fully and determinately expressed. ". . . what the idea always aims to find in its object is nothing whatever but the idea's own conscious purpose or will, embodied in some more determinate form than the idea by itself alone at this instant consciously possesses." In seeking its other it is true that the internal meaning determines its object, but it is also true that the object gives greater clarity and meaning to the internal purpose. So the external meaning does modify the internal meaning and helps it to gain objectivity. Various kinds of experience

¹Ibid., p. 307.

²Ibid., p. 308.

³Ibid., p. 318.

⁴Ibid., pp. 319-20.

illustrate this mutually determining relation between our internal and external meanings, but the case of the mathematician is perhaps the most illuminating. The mathematician creates his own objects and the laws which are to govern them. The things which he concerns himself with are the products of his definitions. But once the mathematician has created his world, this world has authority over his ideas. He may predict or will an object in his world which it will not tolerate. "At any moment, in his further research, he may attempt to define this Other by a conjectural or hypothetical construction, a tentative idea, which may to a large extent prove not to correspond with the fully developed purpose which the result of the inquiry, when reached, presents to consciousness in as determinate form as is humanly possible."¹ On the other hand he may make an hypothesis which proves to be true. The test of truth Royce states as follows: "In so far as we pause satisfied, we observe that there 'is no other' mathematical fact to be sought in the direction of the particular inquiry in hand. Satisfaction of purpose by means of presented fact, and such determinate satisfaction as sends us to no other experience for further light and fulfilment, precisely this outcome is itself the Other that is sought when we begin our inquiry."²

Thinking, then, says Royce, is just this interplay between internal and external meanings. It is precipitated by a vaguely indeterminate act of will and is terminated upon the attainment of an Other which causes the internal meaning to seek no further. "Being" is just the sum-total of these "Others" which our ideas seek in their search for truth. "In its wholeness the world of Being is the world of individually expressed meanings,—an individual life, consisting of all the individual embodiments of the wills represented by all finite ideas."³ Or, otherwise expressed, "To be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal meaning of a certain absolute system of ideas. A system, moreover, which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary."⁴ And in setting forth the details of the nature of being, Royce simply reaffirms the doctrines of God and of man which he set forth in the supplementary essay to The Conception of God.

It is now essential that we inquire whether Royce's argument substantiates the conclusion that reality is an absolute system of ideas and that this system is implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea. Since Royce reaches this

¹Ibid., p. 330.

²Ibid., p. 330.

³Ibid., p. 38.

⁴Ibid., p. 36.

conclusion by way of an examination of the two concepts of "idea" and "object," we shall do well to analyze critically his doctrines of these, and to see whether we are led to "an individual life consisting of the individual embodiments of the wills represented by all finite ideas,"—a life which is all-inclusive, conscious, and eternally complete and perfect.

Royce's insistence that internal and external meanings cannot be sundered but that they mutually determine each other would seem to be true to the facts of our cognitive experience. Internal meanings, or ideas, are called forth in situations which for the moment perplex and baffle us. We are confronted with facts which we cannot handle because they lack sufficient meaning. We have, therefore, what Royce calls a feeling of "indefinite restlessness." Ideas arise in our minds as "plans of action" by means of which we hope to make conquest of these stubborn facts so that our restlessness may be allayed and experience regain that wholeness and continuity which it possessed before these brute facts disrupted it. The idea as a plan is not fixed and determined all at once, nor is the object or the material to be worked upon clearly defined and fixed. Rather, the plan of action is at first "vague" and "indeterminate," and keeps changing in content and growing in clarity as it comes in content with the facts. Likewise, the object is at first vague and lacking in meaning and keeps changing as the ideas assail and overcome it. The idea, thus, in submitting itself to the facts attains greater clarity and precision till finally it is able to realize the purpose which it finally has in respect to the object and so is "true" in respect to it; on the other hand, the object or facts, in submitting themselves to the idea, attain greater and greater significance till finally they become a part of our meaningful experience. Internal and external meanings, thus, appear in our experience as the inner and outer aspects of a meaning-situation which is organically one. They cannot be sundered without each of them becoming a meaningless abstraction. Royce's analysis of our cognitive experience would appear to be accurate up to this point.

But in the further development of his theory Royce's argument takes a turn where it is difficult to follow him. From the statement above as to the relation of internal and external meanings, it would appear that neither the internal nor the external meaning is primary. The two, it would seem, are co-ordinate and mutually determining factors co-operating in the task of reconstructing our experience. And it would further appear that our experienced reality is no more the result of internal than of external meanings. Ideas and facts in their interaction and mutual determination both contribute meaning and determinateness to

reality as we experience it. Royce, however, teaches that internal meanings are primary and that reality is the embodiment of "the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea."¹ This position of Royce's, however, would seem to result from the fact that he unwittingly falls victim to the very danger of which he has so assiduously been warning, namely, the separation of internal and external meanings.

That Royce has in mind more than a merely verbal distinction between internal and external meanings, a distinction useful for purposes of analysis, is evident from his statement that internal meanings get their "final and completely individual expression" in an absolute system of experience. They never get their complete determination in finite experience,—such determination "is for us the object of love and of hope, of desire and of will, of faith and of work, but never of present finding."² Here the distinction is not a verbal one but an actual and complete separation. Our finite internal meanings stand in opposition to the absolute system of external meanings which are the perfect and eternal fulfilment of our internal meanings. And if our internal meanings do not, certainly the absolute system of external meanings stands forth as clear, fixed, and definite,—a situation which would be impossible if internal and external meanings are in constant interplay and mutually determine each other.

With an absolute system of experience thus injected into his theory it is necessary for Royce to bring finite ideas into some sort of relation to it while at the same time saving what he has said about the purposive character of ideas. Royce does this by introducing ambiguity into his notion of the idea as purpose. Now instead of the idea simply being a purpose, it appears that the idea also has a purpose. Our ideas in order to be true must correspond to the absolute system which serves as the eternal and perfect standard for our ideas. The purpose of an idea is to represent "its own final and completely individual expression" which is found in the absolute system. The idea in this way still retains an element of will, but as related to the absolute system that will is simply "to correspond" with the absolute. So to reduce the volitional element in the idea, however, is really to

¹It is true that Royce distinguishes carefully between the "true internal meaning" and the present, partial internal meaning and asserts embodiment only of the former. But this distinction does not lessen the difficulty as our criticism will attempt to point out.

²W. and I., I, 297.

abrogate all that has been said of it in relation to particular inquiries in hand. We are led to wonder, too, as to how ideas can select their objects and determine the type of correspondence they are to have with them when they are viewed as inhabiting the absolute system. Royce's answer is that the selection is made on the basis of a specific want in a concrete situation, such as singing in tune, finding a mathematical equation, etc. But this to all intents and purposes is the object of our finite experience. And if we ask for a criterion of truth by means of which we can test this correspondence of a finite idea with an object in the absolute system, the only one which Royce proposes is the fulfilment of its purpose. "It is true—this instant's idea—if, in its own measure and on its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own final and completely individual expression."¹ But when we attempt to discover just how a finite purpose, arising in a concrete situation, can be fulfilled by an absolute experience, we find that this is done so much in terms of our finite human experience that we wonder why an absolute system is invoked at all. Royce's answer is that our present fulfilment is partial and only hints at a complete and absolute fulfilment. But the fact is that my present fulfilment is not considered partial until an absolute and whole experience or fulfilment is brought in.

In short, while ideas may conceivably have a two-fold purpose, namely, that of meeting and overcoming the problems of finite life and that of corresponding to the absolute, the difficulty is to find a criterion whereby we can be assured that this correspondence has been reached. The only criterion which Royce proposes in this connection has always been in terms of fulfilling the needs of finite life. In another connection it is true that Royce does give a criterion of absolute truth. He says that we are in possession of absolute truth "whenever we have found a series of propositions relating to the constitution of the realm of experience, and such that, as soon as you try to deny these propositions, you implicitly reaffirm them by your very attempt at denial."² But even so, we would still be faced with the necessity of regarding thought as having two separate and entirely different functions: first, the function of corresponding to the absolute; second, the function of solving the problems of finite experience. Likewise, we would have two criteria for truth: one which will tell us when our thought is identical with that of the Absolute, the other which will tell us when we have successfully met the demands of practical life. Such a dualism, however,

¹Ibid., I, 339.

²Ibid., p. xi.

strikes one as intolerable and so Royce strives so strenuously to bring the two together into some sort of working unity. Royce's efforts in this respect, however, can hardly be said to have been successful if the point of the foregoing criticism is in any degree allowed to stand.

All of the preceding considerations lead one to suspect that the absolute system is nothing more than an abstraction of the element of wholeness which our experience continually possesses, just as the absolutely fragmentary character which Royce attributes to our experience is an abstraction of the relatively fragmentary character which our experience again and again possesses. Certain it is, if our observations have been at all true, that Royce's Absolute, far from being integrally and organically related to our finite experience so as to give it additional meaning and significance, is quite externally and unnecessarily related to it.

God as a "Self-Representative System"

In a supplementary essay to the first volume of The World and the Individual, Royce undertakes to meet specifically the charge of Bradley's Appearance and Reality that "the conception of the actually infinite multitude is a self-contradictory conception" and involves an "infinite process." Royce believed that Bradley's doctrine was striking at the very heart of the type of idealism which he was defending and that a complete refutation of it was necessary if his idealism was to stand.

Royce defines his task as being that "of vindicating the concept of the actual Infinite against the charge of self-contradiction of defending the concept of the Self against a like charge [and of showing] something of the true relations of the One and the Many in the real world."¹

Royce's synthesizing concept is found in the idea of an infinite totality which is actual as a "self-representative system,"—a concept which Professor Mead characterized as Royce's "stroke of genius."² By this phrase Royce means a system in which we find "the development of an Infinite Multitude out of the expression of a single purpose."³ By means of this conception Royce comes to the following conclusions, stated by Professor Muirhead

¹W. and I., I, Supplementary Essay, p. 476.

²"The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey in their American Setting," John Dewey, The Man and his Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), p. 92.

³W. and I., I, Supplementary Essay, p. 502.

as follows:

"that we have instances in our finite experiences of thought moving, proprio motu, to further determinations of its object in a way completely comprehensible; That, although this involves an infinite process, the result is not merely negative in the sense that it fails to give us the individuality of which we are in search,—on the contrary, it gives us results which are novel and unique; that we do not escape from such a process in the Absolute itself: in it we must have knowledge of its own knowledge to infinity; that, in this way, self-consciousness ipso facto survives in it."¹

Bradley had asserted that the World of Appearance does not furnish any example of a logically consistent "principle or principles of diversity in unity." Royce asserts that there are numerous instances of such,—cases in which "a single purpose, definable as One, demands for its realization a multitude of particulars which could not be a limited multitude without involving the direct defeat of the purpose itself."² Royce takes as his first example the attempt to make, in the country to be mapped, a perfectly complete map the parts of which are intended to correspond, one to one, to every last feature of the country to be mapped,—in this case England.³ Now what, asks Royce, would be the result of trying to fulfil this purpose? Our map, in order to be complete would have to contain itself as one of the features of England; this would necessitate another map, and this another map, ad infinitum. The process could never be ended without a confession that the original purpose had failed.

Now, in this case, and in the numerous others which Royce gives from mathematics, we have "an instance of an internally Self-Representative System, or, more exactly, of a system precisely represented by a proper fraction or portion of itself."⁴ In all of these instances, we have our thought, by its own proprius motus developing diversity out of unity according to a single purpose; we have a product which is perfectly novel and unique; and we have thought recognizing this product as its own.

Royce next generalizes the conception of a "self-representative system" and applies it to the world in all its parts and as a whole. It now serves as vindicator of the ideas expressed

¹The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 394.

²W. and I., I, Supplementary Essay, p. 501.

³Ibid., p. 501.

⁴Ibid., p. 509.

throughout Royce's philosophy that the finite individual whether regarded as thinker, moral agent, etc., gets his meaning fulfilled not in an endless temporal quest but in the life of the Eternal Infinite. Every finite reality, that is, is really a self-representative system getting its fulfilment in an Eternal Absolute.

It is difficult to see how the conception of a "mathematical infinite" which Royce introduces at this stage of his thought affords a way of escape from the perplexities which accompany his metaphysical infinite. Royce's metaphysical infinite is one of completeness and perfection. The mathematical series which Royce advances as examples of infinities are not actual infinities at all. They are really endlessly growing finites, and the corresponding operation of thought is not an infinite, all-complete, and perfect one, but simply an indefinite continuation of recurrent operations of thought. Royce's argument carries the plausibility it does because of the abstract nature of the examples. But it is one thing to see how a mathematical series or a conceived absolutely perfect map breaks out into infinite multiplicity and yet are united because of a hypothetical, unreal purpose, and quite another matter to see how a concrete, actual thing can break out into the multiplicity of self-representative concrete finites and still remain united in the unity of a single life or purpose applicable to our experience. The fact is that if we stay in the realm of concrete experience, we find reality reaching its limit always by perceptible amounts, by endlessly growing finites. And Royce's mathematical series are simply "conceptualized" accounts of how concrete reality grows. As James pointed out in the same connection, "The infinite character we find in it is woven into it by our later conception indefinitely repeating the act of subdividing any given amount supposed. The facts do not resist the subsequent conceptual treatment; but we need not believe that the treatment necessarily reproduces the operation by which they were originally brought into existence."¹ In other words, Royce's argument carries what conviction it does, because it leaves the world of concrete objects and enters into a world of transparent abstractness.

Royce believes that his conception of a self-representative system saves the reality of time. As a matter of fact, however, what we have throughout the discussion is logical implication to which time is irrelevant. If we give up time, as Royce really does, then such a self-representative system is conceptually possible. On the other hand, if we keep time, then the eternally

¹Some Problems of Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1911), p. 185.

perfect and complete self-representative system recedes in the background.

Concluding Remarks

A few remarks remain to be said concerning the value of Royce's conception of God for the religious consciousness. It was previously remarked that the conception of an absolute mind composed of many minds is conceivable but is attended by the difficulty of explaining what type of thinking, feeling, willing, etc., is enjoyed by the absolute mind. Royce frankly faces this difficulty, as indeed he must if his conception is to have value for the religious mind, and he believes that he has successfully shown that the absolute mind thinks, feels, wills, etc., in a sense which is intelligible to us. The critical discussions of the present chapter, however, would seem to indicate that Royce becomes involved in a host of ambiguities when he attributes the same mental processes to the absolute that he attributes to finite beings. Such terms as "thought," "will," "feeling," "individuality," "self-consciousness," etc., when attributed to God do not possess the meaning which they have when applied to finite beings. In fact, it is only by a tour de force that Royce can apply them to his conception of God. Instead of furnishing the religious consciousness with a conception of God which is of value and significance for religious experience, it would seem that Royce has really set forth a conception of God which he seeks so earnestly to avoid, namely, a God who is a "void into which the finite realities pass and vanish,"¹ "an Ineffable Mystery, which we can only silently adore."²

The particular aspect of Royce's doctrine which is responsible for this particular set of difficulties is that part of it which holds that the universal mind is eternal and completed. If Royce would admit a genuine "creative advance," to borrow an expression of Whitehead, as something applicable to reality at large, a number of his difficulties would disappear. For then the all-inclusive mind could conceivably think, will, and be moral in the sense of realizing in time an as yet unrealized goal.

Moreover, it can hardly be said that Royce has satisfactorily explained the relation of God to man, the relation of the divine will to human wills. It is difficult to comprehend the fact that the finite will is free to realize itself in time, yet is eternally completed and realized since it is a part of the will of God. And the status of the individual in the eternal life of

¹C. G., p. 347.

²Ibid., pp. 49-50.

God remains obscure,—it is difficult to see how the individual, as a conscious, moral ego is preserved in eternity if Royce's argument be taken as true. For on the one hand he asserts that moral self-hood and individuality depends upon the pursuit of an unrealized goal, and on the other hand he asserts that our goals are attained in eternity without loss to our eternal moral selfhood,—we are in God, but we are not lost in God. Finally, Royce's doctrine that the soul of man, as a member of the world of appreciation, is free, while the body, as a member of the world of description, is subject to mechanical law brings into ever bolder relief the lack of a truly organic relation between the world of eternity and that of time.

CHAPTER IV

GOD AS THE "BELOVED COMMUNITY"

The years immediately following the writing of The World and the Individual Royce devotes to the writing of articles which give further confirmation to the conception of God as presented in the last chapter. Throughout this period Royce attempts to show that the conception of God to which he is adhering is not so different from the conception of God as it is found in the Christian religion. However, it is in the final stage of his thinking that Royce turns to the task of relating more specifically his conception of God to the Christian religion. But the argument of this period assumes an entirely different form, a study of which will bring to completion our attempt to trace the development of Royce's idea of God.

In his last writings, Royce dwells more and more on the category of the "social" and of the "community." "The universe is a realm which is through and through dominated by social categories."¹ "Not the Self, not the Logos, not the One, and not the Many, but the Community," says Royce, "will be the ruling category. . . ."² And it is this conception which suffuses Royce's entire later philosophy. Thus, Ethics teaches loyalty to the community as the highest virtue. Religion holds that the community is the only object of worship and the sole source of salvation for the individual. Metaphysics demonstrates the existence of a universal community, while Epistemology has to do with a community of interpretation.

Royce himself refers to the final statement of his philosophy as the "philosophy of loyalty," and declares that when the doctrine of loyalty is fully developed and understood it "helps us toward a genuine insight, not only into the plan of life, but into the nature of things."³ It is to the various aspects of the

¹The Problem of Christianity (New York: Macmillan Co., 1913), II, 280. This work will hereafter be referred to as Prob. of Chr.

²Ibid., II, 281.

³William James and other Essays on the Philosophy of Life (New York: Macmillan Co., 1911), p. 68.

philosophy of loyalty that we must now turn in order to get before us the conception of God as developed in the last stage of Royce's philosophy.

Its Basis in Morality

It is in the book entitled The Philosophy of Loyalty that Royce puts forth his first thorough-going treatment of the problems of the moral life since his The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. The solution of the problems of ethics Royce now finds in the concept of loyalty. It is by means of loyalty to a cause that the individual finds his own rational will fulfilled in a good which is at the same time the good of society. The individual by himself cannot determine his ideal good, since he is simply a chaos of conflicting passions and impulses and without any ideals. In order to get harmony and plan into his life, the individual must submit to the moral training and education which society gives him. But in training the individual, society comes in conflict with the individual's passions and desires. This conflict is settled when the individual becomes devoted to a cause. In loyalty one is thoroughly submissive to a social plan, and through loyalty one comes to the fullest realization of himself. "In loyalty, when loyalty is properly defined," says Royce, "is the fulfilment of the whole moral law."¹ And, again, "In this cause is your life, your will, your opportunity, your fulfilment."²

However, it is not sufficient, says Royce, to merely insist upon loyalty to loyalty. What each individual wants to know further is: Are our loyalties well-founded and true or merely illusory? Are our loyalties somehow truly related to the very nature of things or are they merely human affairs, subject to capricious human experience? In other words, the loyal individual wants to be assured that Ultimate Reality somehow stands as guarantor for loyalty as the supreme good. "What must be true about the universe if even loyalty itself is a genuine good, and not a merely inevitable human illusion?"³

Loyalty to a cause, we have seen, links various human lives into the unity of a single life. Over and above the separate individuals, there is a superpersonal union which also enters into the cause. Now if loyalty is to have any foundation in fact, these superpersonal entities must have real objective existence independent of any one man's or any one group's consciousness.

¹The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), p. 15. This work is referred to below as P. L.

²Ibid., p. 42.

³Ibid., p. 307.

The "central characteristic of the loyal spirit," says Royce, "consists in the fact that it conceives and values its cause as a reality, as an object that has a being of its own."¹

It follows, thus, that if the loyal are not deluded in their faith, if the moral life is not to be a service of myths, the real world must be one in which we find spiritual unities which transcend the experience of any one man or group of men,—unities which have a personal, conscious existence upon a higher-than-human level. Just as my special causes combine to make a single life of loyalty, so do all the causes in the universe combine in a universal life of loyalty to Universal Loyalty, that is, loyalty to the Eternal, Absolute Cause which is God himself.

Its Basis in Religion

It is in his last work of importance, the two volumes entitled The Problem of Christianity that we find a further development and exposition of the implications of "loyalty." "This book," says Royce, "if it is nothing else, is at least one more effort to tell what loyalty is."² In this work Royce is particularly concerned with developing the religious implications of the ideal of loyalty and with showing their epistemological and metaphysical foundations. Already, in The Philosophy of Loyalty we found that ethical doctrine leads Royce over into religion. In it he asks: "Is not this real world, whose true unity the loyal acknowledge by their very deed, and whose conscious unity every process of truth-seeking presupposes,—is not this also the world which religion recognizes?"³ And in The Sources of Religious Insight Royce further discusses the essentially religious nature of loyalty, and declares: "The cause is a religious object. It finds you in your need. It points out to you the way of salvation. Its presence in your world is to you a free gift from the realm of spirit—a gift that you have not of yourself, but through the willingness of the world to manifest to you the way of salvation. This free gift first compels your love. Then you freely give yourself in return."⁴

In The Problem of Christianity the religion of loyalty assumes the form of a "religion of . . . 'The Beloved Community.'"⁵ As the title of the work indicates, Royce is attempting to interpret Christianity in terms of the religion of loyalty and of the

¹William James and other Essays, p. 71.

²Prob. of Chr., I, xviii.

³Ibid., pp. 376-77.

⁴Sources of Religious Insight (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1912), p. 206.

⁵Prob. of Chr., I, pp. xxv, 172.

community. Since our treatment is concerned not so much with Royce's interpretation of Christianity as with his interpretation of religion in general, the doctrines of "Community," "Sin," "Salvation," and "Atonement" are discussed in general, since they are all "verifiable results of the higher social religious experience of mankind,"¹ and need no theological dogma or creed to sustain them.

The universal community.- The conception of "community" which Royce holds corresponds to the Pauline conception of the Church taken in its most mystical sense. Thus St. Paul speaks of the Church as the mystical body of Christ, of which Christ is the head and lover. This Being, or Church, is, for Paul, something vitally real and concrete whose being is more real than that of any individual. Paul calls this being a "mystery," and invokes the love and loyalty of all the faithful upon it. Together with God and one's neighbor it is the object of Christian love and devotion.

The lost individual.- The natural individual is a center of impulses and tendencies which have been inherited. In themselves, these tendencies are neither good nor bad. However, through training and experience these tendencies become integrated into habits and voluntary actions. Oftentimes these modes of conduct which grow out of the individual's impulses and tendencies come in conflict with the standards set by society, and also with what the individual has come to view, through training, as his ideal. It is in these situations of social tension that the moral individual is born and comes to a consciousness of himself. For in this conflict he begins to criticize and contrast his own ideals and modes of conduct with those of his fellows; and he sets himself apart from his fellows and recognizes himself for what he is, namely, an individual moral agent. In other words, our moral self-consciousness is a product of our social life; or, as Royce states it, the individual "comes to self-consciousness as a moral being through the spiritual warfare of mutual observation, of mutual criticism, of rivalry. . . ."²

But this contrast and differentiation of the individual and society, instead of being attenuated by social training, is made the more acute. For the more trained and educated the individual becomes, the more individualistic and sensitive he becomes as an individual. He recognizes his social obligations, but at the same time he struggles for freedom, and for release from society and the standards which it imposes upon him. The individ-

¹Ibid., I, xx.

²Ibid., I, 139.

ual, thus, is a divided man, and this division, Royce points out, "is due to the very conditions to which the development of self-consciousness is subject. . . ."¹

Salvation and atonement.- Is there now any escape from this division within ourselves? Is there any way by which the divided self can become an integrated, unified self? Royce's answer is of course now obvious. Escape and salvation come through loyalty. It is only through loyalty to a community that the self-consciousness of the individual becomes transformed into a new type of self-consciousness in which division gives way to unity and in which the natural self is made into a new creature. For in being loyal to a community, the individual loses his natural selfhood and identifies himself with a Being of far greater value and worth than the individual himself. And to this absolutely lovable community Royce gives a name. He says: "And the community to which, when grace saves him, the convert is thenceforth to be loyal we may here venture to call by a name which we have not hitherto used. Let this name be 'The Beloved Community.'"² And, Royce continues, "The beloved community embodies, for its lover, values which no human individual, viewed as a detached being, could even remotely approach."³

Sin now becomes treason to the community. A traitor is a man who has found and been loyal to a cause or beloved community, and then has deliberately been false to it. And because the sinful deed is done and beyond recall, it is ipso facto irrevocable, and the traitor is condemned to the "hell of the irrevocable."⁴ The deed has been committed and nothing the traitor can do will annul it.

Now how can this sin be atoned for and the beloved community again healed? "I answer," says Royce, "this triumph over treason can only be accomplished by the community, or on behalf of the community, through some steadfastly loyal servant who acts, so to speak, as the incarnation of the very spirit of the community itself."⁵ The traitorous act of the faithless individual is transformed by the faithful servant of the community who performs a deed which grows out of just this act of treason and which makes the whole world better than it would have been had not the deed of treason and the act of atonement been done. And the supreme postulate of the highest spiritually, says Royce, is just this postulate of atonement: "No baseness or cruelty of treason so

¹Ibid., I, 155.

²Ibid., I, 172.

³Ibid., I, 173.

⁴Ibid., I, 279.

⁵Ibid., I, 306-307.

deep or so tragic shall enter our human world, but that loyal love shall be able in due time to oppose to just that deed of treason its fitting deed of atonement."¹

Its Basis in Epistemology and Metaphysics

Royce is not content, however, to conceive this absolute transcendent community as a mystical reality resting on mystical rather than on rational, demonstrable grounds. The early Christian, says Royce, may have grasped the truth of this community through an act of faith, but the modern man can defend it on rational, metaphysical grounds.

According to Royce, we are led to the view that a world of interpretation exists by both our science and common-sense. The maxim of science is that the experience of an individual observer cannot be accepted as a fact until it is interpreted to and confirmed by scientists in general, that is, by the scientific community. So long as an experience cannot be shared by the community, it remains a purely subjective and personal one and lacks that objectivity essential to all experiences that are to attain the status of scientific fact. Common-sense reinforces this view. For it bases its belief in the existence of an external world on the social character of our knowledge. That is, "any individual who asserts the reality of an objective fact is appealing to a community of interpretation and assuming that it is there."²

In short, the doctrine of interpretation indicates that if our science has any genuine reality and if our common-sense knowledge of common objects has any basis in fact, then the world must be of the nature of a community. All of our knowledge of a common world, says Royce, involves the process of interpretation, and since the process of interpretation is meaningless without the existence of the community, it follows that the nature of ultimate reality is social which is the thesis to be proved.

Practically, my will demands that the community exist, for without the community I cannot reach that fulfilment, that realization and salvation which gives meaning to my life. Theoretically, my will demands that the community exist in order that common-sense and science have meaning and significance. My life is meaningless, both practically and theoretically, unless the community exist.

In short, Royce's metaphysical thesis is this: The world is an endless temporal process of the spirit and is through and through a process of interpretation in which the present is

¹Ibid., I, 322.

²Ibid., II, 246.

interpreting the past to the future. And because it is a process of interpretation, it is essentially a Community in structure,—it is a plurality of individuals which somehow coalesce into an Absolute Individual.

Further analysis of Royce's metaphysics of interpretation reveals a difficulty concerning the relation of the absolute to the process of interpretation which is analogous to that found in a previous discussion concerning the relation of the absolute to the temporal order. On the one hand, time is discussed in terms of interpretation as follows: "Time, for instance, expresses a system of essentially social relations. The present interprets the past to the future."¹ Royce teaches that "this whole time-process is in some fashion spanned by one insight which surveys the unity of its meaning. . . . Its value is the one empirically known to us at any one moment when we clearly contrast two of our own ideas and find their mediator."² Royce refers to "the power of an individual self to extend his life, in ideal fashion, so as to regard it as including past and future which lie far away in time and which he does not now remember."³ In this description of time, it would seem that there is an actual, immediately experienced present in which the past and future are carried in ideal or symbolic form. Now such a view of time accords with finite experience of time and interpretation. Finite beings do live in a "specious present" in which the past is or may be remembered and in which the future is or may be projected in symbolic form. Or, in the case of nature to which Royce also alludes, we do find the past imbedded in the present and making it what it is. In this view of time we have no hint that the past or the future is existing in the same way that the immediately experienced present exists. And in this view, we have a divine community in a real time-order progressively entering new specious presents and interpreting the past, which exists in symbolic form, to a future which is also conceived in ideal form. On this view Royce gives a time-order entirely intelligible to finite minds and a doctrine of interpretation easily comprehended.

But Royce brings confusion into his theory by supplementing this view of time and of interpretation with another. He speaks of the absolute experience as an "experience which itself includes a synoptic survey of the whole of time."⁴ This survey is not a symbolic grasping of the whole of time, but is an actual and immediate experiencing of all time. It is the eternal time-

¹Ibid., II, 280.

²Ibid., II, 271.

³Ibid., II, 60.

⁴Ibid., II, 286.

span of Royce's previous discussions. Past, present, and future are all present in precisely the same way, namely, as parts of the Absolute's immediate experience. No longer do past and future appear in symbolic or representative fashion, but immediately.

To identify this "synoptic survey" with interpretation as Royce does is to empty the latter of all meaning for finite beings. Nothing in finite social experience indicates that in a process of interpretation the past and future are present in any other than in symbolic form. Neither the past as past nor the future as future are directly and immediately present to the interpreter in finite processes of interpretation. Royce's statement that the fact, that an individual finite self is able to extend his life in ideal fashion so as to include both past and future, enables us to understand how an eternal, all-embracing divine community is possible rests upon a misapplication of finite experience.

Concluding Remarks

It may well be questioned whether the Divine Community of Royce's later philosophy is identical with the Absolute of his earlier thought. An examination of the place of the finite individual in the absolute and eternal scheme of reality tends to bear out the suspicion that the two are quite different. In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy the finite individual is temporal only,—"We know nothing about personal immortality," says Royce.¹ If the finite individual remains at all in eternity, it is only as a memory in the mind of the Absolute. "We perish, but thou endurest. Ours is not thy eternity. But in thy eternity we would be remembered. . . ."² In short, the social, the community, appears as a purely temporal phenomenon awakening in man a knowledge of his true dependence and relation to the Absolute,—"*independence is a temporal means, whose ultimate aim is harmony and unity of all men on a higher plane.*"³ The Absolute, in reality, is one will and appears as many independent wills only in the temporal order. Community, thus, is not an eternal aspect of the Absolute Life.

In The Conception of God and in The World and the Individual the individual does not seem to be temporal and derived. "This your own way of expressing God's will is not derived. It is yourself. And it is yours because God worketh in you."⁴ Likewise, it would appear that the finite individual, as individual

¹The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 478.

²Ibid., p. 440.

³Ibid., p. 216.

⁴W. and I., II, 293. Royce's italics.

is immortal. You are in God, says Royce, but you are not lost in God. But a difficulty attends this doctrine of immortality of the individual: the individual is an individual by virtue of the fact that he is in pursuit of an unattained goal. The attainment of the goal in eternity would seem to necessitate cessation of individuality in eternity, but this Royce denies. How a finite being can still remain an individual when stripped of the conditions whereby individuality becomes possible Royce did not make clear. The social, the community, in this stage of Royce's thought was left ambiguous and obscure.

In the philosophy of loyalty as developed in the last stage of Royce's thought, the social appears distinctly as ultimate. The Absolute is a divine community in which the many are underived and eternal, since "A community immediately presents itself to our minds both as one and as many and unless it is both one and many it is no community at all."¹ Unity and plurality are co-eternal. However, as we have seen, Royce proceeds to identify this unity with an individual super-mind which is eternal and inclusive, and in such a world no place is found for real individuality and freedom as we know it. So long as Royce speaks of this unity as a community, eternal and ultimate, his position strikes one as having been quite radically altered since plurality now for the first time becomes clearly ultimate and is never lost sight of.

The general conclusion which we reach as a result of our study is that Royce does not succeed in reaching a conception of God which is at once theoretically and practically acceptable. Much as we can admire the ingenuity and frankness with which Royce faced his problems, we must nevertheless insist that his conception of God is beset with insurmountable difficulties. His doctrine of the ontological reality of God, though claiming to be a demonstration, is at best a hypothetical one. His teachings concerning the nature of God, though couched in familiar terms and phrases, are found to be for the most part meaningless and bereft of value for the ordinary religious consciousness. His philosophy concerning the relation of God to reality and in particular to man is left obscure and ambiguous. Certainly, in a completed, perfect order no place appears to be left for the free and active agents which finite men feel themselves to be.

¹Prob. of Chr., II, 17.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Writings of Royce¹

- "The Intention of the Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus," Bulletin of The University of California, No. XVI (June, 1875). Berkeley: University Press.
- "The Life-Harmony," Overland Monthly, XV (1875), 157-64.
- "Thought Diary," Berkeley, 1878-9, Harvard University Library, unpublished.
- "Schiller's Ethical Studies," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, XII (1878), 373-92.
- Fugitive Essays By Josiah Royce, with an introduction by Dr. J. Loewenberg. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925.
(These essays were written from 1878 to 1903.)
- "Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, XV (1881), 360-81.
- "'Mind-stuff' and Reality," Mind, VI (1881), 365-77.
- "Mind and Reality," Mind, VII (1882), 30-54.
- The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1885. Second edition, 1887.
- "The Outlook in Ethics," International Journal of Ethics, II (1891), 106-11.
- The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1892.
- "The Knowledge of Good and Evil," International Journal of Ethics, IV (1893), 48-80.
- "The External World and the Social Consciousness," Philosophical Review, III (1894), 513-45.
- "Self-consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature," Philosophical Review, IV (1895), 465-84, 577-602.
- "Natural Law, Ethics and Evolution," International Journal of Ethics, V (1895), 489-500.
- The Conception of God: Together with comments thereon by S. E. Mezes, J. Le Conte, and G. H. Howison. New York: Macmillan Co., 1895. The second edition is enlarged by "The Absolute and the Individual: a supplementary discussion with replies to criticisms" by Professor Royce. New York: Macmillan Co., 1897.

¹Arranged in the order of their writing.

- "The Augustus Graham Lectures on Theism," 1896. Harvard University Library, unpublished.
- Studies of Good and Evil. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1898.
- "Five Lectures on the Social Factors of the Human Intellect," 1897. Harvard University Library, unpublished.
- The World and the Individual, 2 vols. New York and London: Macmillan Co., 1900-1902.
- The Conception of Immortality. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1900.
- "The Concept of the Infinite," Hibbert Journal, I (1902), 21-45.
- "The Problem of Natural Religion," International Quarterly, VII (1903), 85-107.
- "What Should Be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy Toward Religion?" International Journal of Ethics, XIII (1903), 280-85.
- "The Eternal and the Practical," Philosophical Review, XIII (1904), 113-42.
- "Immortality," Hibbert Journal, V (1907), 724-44.
- The Philosophy of Loyalty. New York: Macmillan Co., 1908.
- "What Is Vital in Christianity?" Harvard Theological Review, II (1909), 408-45.
- "Axiom," Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, II, 279-82. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1910.
- "The Reality of the Temporal," International Journal of Ethics, XX (1910), 257-71.
- William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life. New York: Macmillan Co., 1911.
- "James as a Philosopher," Science, N. S., XXXIV (1911), 33-45.
- "Principien Der Logik," Encyclopadie Der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, I (1912), 61-136.
- The Sources of Religious Insight. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1912.
- The Problem of Christianity, 2 vols. New York: Macmillan Co., 1913.
- "The Second Death," Atlantic Monthly, CXI (1913), 242-54.
- "Atonement," Atlantic Monthly, CXI (1913), 406-19.
- "Some Psychological Problems Emphasized by Pragmatism," Popular Science Monthly, LXXXIII (1913), 394-411.
- "The Christian Doctrine of Life," Hibbert Journal, XI (1913), 473-96.
- "Mind," Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, VIII (1916), 649-57.
- "Order," Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, IX (1917), 533-40.
- The Hope of the Great Community. New York: Macmillan Co., 1916. Posthumous.

Lectures on Modern Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. Posthumous.

- Expositions and Criticisms of Royce's Philosophy
Albeggiani, Ferdinando. Il Sistema Filosofico di Josiah Royce.
Palermo: Editore Trimarchi, 1930.
- Alexander, S. "Review of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,"
Mind, X (1885), 599-605.
- Aliotta. The Idealistic Reaction Against Science. London: Mac-
millan Co., 1914. Pp. 240-69.
- Aronson, M. J. La Philosophie Morale de Josiah Royce. Paris:
Librairie Felix Alcan, 1927.
- Bakewell, C. M. "Review of The World and the Individual," Inter-
national Journal of Ethics, XII (1901-02), 389-98.
- Bradley, F. H. Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 277-80. Oxford,
1914.
- Brown, W. A. "Review of The Problem of Christianity," Journal of
Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, XL (1914), 608-14.
- Buckham, J. W. "The Contribution of Professor Royce to Christian
Thought," Harvard Theological Review, VII (1915), 219-37.
- Carr, F. S. "Royce's Philosophy of Religion," Bibliotheca Sacra,
LXXI (1914), 282-95.
- Creighton, J. E. "Review of The Spirit of Modern Philosophy,"
Philosophical Review, I (1892), 322-25.
- Creighton, J. E. "Review of Studies of Good and Evil," Philosophi-
cal Review, III (1899), 66-69.
- Creighton, J. E. "Review of William James and Other Essays on the
Philosophy of Life," Philosophical Review, XXI (1912), 478-79.
- Cunningham, G. W. The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and
American Philosophy, pp. 253-91, 428-51. New York: Century
Co., 1933.
- Dewey, J. "Review of The World and the Individual, Vol. I,"
Philosophical Review, IX (1900), 311-24. Review of Vol. II,
ibid., XI (1902), 392-407.
- Dewey, J. "A Reply to Professor Royce's Critique of Instrumental-
ism," Philosophical Review, XXI (1912), 69-81.
- Driscoll, J. T. Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea, pp. 245-
54. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915.
- Fullerton, G. S. A System of Metaphysics, pp. 585-97. New York:
Macmillan Co., 1901.
- Hocking, W. E. The Meaning of God in Human Experience, see index.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912.
- Hocking, W. E. "Review of The Problem of Christianity," Harvard
Theological Review, VII (1914), 107-12.
- Hoernle, R. F. A. "Review of William James and Other Essays, etc.,"

- Mind, XXXVIII (1913), 563-66.
- Hoernle, R. F. A. Idealism as a Philosophy, see index. New York: Geo. H. Doran Co., 1927.
- Jacks, L. P. "Review of The Problem of Christianity," Hibbert Journal, XII (1913), 215-20.
- James, Henry, editor. The Letters of William James, 2 vols., see index. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920.
- James, William. Pragmatism, see index. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907.
- James, William. A Pluralistic Universe, see index. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911.
- James, William. Some Problems of Philosophy, see index. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911.
- Jefferson, H. B. "Royce on the Problem of Evil," Journal of Religion, XI (1931), 359-77.
- Jones, Henry. "Review of The World and the Individual," Hibbert Journal, I (1902-03), 132-44.
- Kallen, H. M. "Review of William James and other Essays, etc.," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, IX (1912), 548-58.
- Leidecker, K. F. Josiah Royce and Indian Thought. New York: Kailas Press, 1931.
- Loewenberg, J. "Review of The Sources of Religious Insight," International Journal of Ethics, XXIII (1912), 85-88.
- Macintosh, D. C. The Problem of Knowledge, see index. New York: Macmillan Co., 1915.
- Macintosh, D. C. The Pilgrimage of Faith, see index. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1931.
- McTaggart, J. E. "Review of The World and the Individual, Vol. I," Mind, XXV (1900), 258-66. Review of Vol. II, Mind, XXVII (1902), 557-63.
- Marcel, Gabriel. "La Metaphysique de Josiah Royce," Revue de Metaphysic et de Morale (1918, 1919).
- Mead, G. H. "The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey in their American Setting," John Dewey, The Man and his Philosophy, pp. 75-105. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930.
- Moore, A. W. "Existence, Meaning, and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology," The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, First Series, III, 37-39. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903.
- Moore, A. W. "Some Logical Aspects of Purpose," Studies in Logical Theory, ed. J. Dewey, pp. 341-82. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903.
- Moore, A. W. Pragmatism and its Critics, pp. 62-69. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910.

- Muirhead, J. H. The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy, pp. 347-412. New York: Macmillan Co., 1931.
- Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce on his Sixtieth Birthday, 1916.
Appeared also as Vol. XXV, No. 3 (May, 1916), of the Philosophical Review, pp. 229-522.
- Perry, R. B. "Professor Royce's Refutation of Realism and Pluralism," The Monist, XII (1902), 446-58.
- Perry, R. B. Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 175-81, and see index. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912.
- Perry, R. B. The Present Conflict of Ideals, pp. 267-71. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918.
- Peirce, Charles Sanders. "Review of The World and the Individual, Vol. I," The Nation, LXX (1900), 267. Review of Vol. II, The Nation, LXXV (1902), 94-96.
- Peirce, Charles Sanders. Collected Papers, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Vol. I, Principles of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931.
- Philp, J. H. "The Principle of Individuation in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce." Doctor's thesis, Yale University, 1916.
- Riley, W. American Thought, pp. 253-65. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1915.
- Rogers, A. K. "Professor Royce and Monism," Philosophical Review, XII (1903), 47-61.
- Rogers, A. K. English and American Philosophy since 1800, pp. 283-97. New York: Macmillan Co., 1923
- Santayana, G. Character and Opinion in the United States, pp. 97-138. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons Co., 1920.
- Scott, J. W. "Review of The Philosophy of Loyalty," Mind, XVIII (1909), 270-76.
- Sharp, F. C. "Review of The Philosophy of Loyalty," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, VI (1909), 77-80.
- Smith, T. V. The Philosophic Way of Life, pp. 37-68. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929.
- Sorley, W. R. "Review of The Philosophy of Loyalty," Hibbert Journal, VII (1908), 207-10.
- Thilly, F. "Review of The Philosophy of Loyalty," Philosophical Review, XVII (1908), 541-48.

Miscellaneous Works Read or Consulted in the
Preparation of the Present Essay

- Ames, E. S. "Religion in Terms of Social Consciousness," Journal of Religion, I (1921), 264-70.
- Ames, E. S. "The Validity of the Idea of God," Journal of Religion, I (1921), 462-81.
- Ames, E. S. "Religious Values and the Practical Absolute," Inter-

- national Journal of Ethics XXXII (1921-22), 347-65.
- Ames, E. S. The Psychology of Religious Experience. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910.
- Ames, E. S. Religion. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929.
- Ames, E. S. "Religious Values and Philosophical Criticism," Essays in Honor of John Dewey, pp. 23-35. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929.
- Arnold, Matthew. God and the Bible. New York: Macmillan Co., 1875.
- Burt, E. A. Religion in an Age of Science. New York: Fred A. Stokes Co., 1929.
- Bradley, F. H. Appearance and Reality. London: Geo. Allen and Unwin, 1893. Seventh impression of 2nd edition, 1920.
- Case, S. J. "The Historical Study of Religion," Journal of Religion, I(1921), 1-17.
- Dewey, J. Experience and Nature. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925.
- Dewey, J. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balch, & Co., 1929.
- Galloway, G. The Philosophy of Religion. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916.
- Harris, W. T. "Introduction to the Reader," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, I (1867), 1 ff.
- Haydon, A. E. The Quest of the Ages. New York: Harper & Bros., 1929.
- Hoffding, H. History of Modern Philosophy. New York: Macmillan Co., 1900.
- Horton, W. M. Theism and the Modern World. New York: Harper & Bros., 1930.
- James, William. The Will to Believe and other Essays. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.
- James, William. Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902.
- Macintosh, D. C., and others. Religious Realism. New York: Macmillan Co., 1931.
- Matthews, S. The Growth of the Idea of God. New York: Macmillan Co., 1931.
- Morris, C. W. Six Theories of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932.
- Russell, Bertrand. "The Free Man's Worship," Philosophical Essays. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910.
- Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World. New York: Macmillan Co., 1926.
- Whitehead, A. N. Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929.

Wieman, H. N. Religious Experience and Scientific Method. New York: Macmillan Co., 1926.

Wieman, H. N. The Wrestle of Religion with Truth. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929.

